19561

VAGRANCY-TYPE LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION *
Caleb Footet
I. INTRODUCTION

This study combines analysis of the history, theory and purposes
of vagrancy-type laws with a report of their administration by the
police, magistrates and correctional authorities in Philadelphia. Such
a dual approach is essential. Minor offenses are seldom reviewed by
higher courts, and the actual limits of vagrancy are set not in the statute
but by practices .of police and magistrates. Conversely, an intelligent
appraisal of these practices requires some historical orientation. The
vagrancy laws " . . . might be unintelligible if we did not regard
them as a supplement to the old Poor Laws .
"; 1 they continue

to reflect their inception in the fourteenth century when they were "a
kind of substitute for the system of villainage and serfdom." 2
The material on the administration of vagrancy-type laws was obtained by a field study of Philadelphia practices. The basic technique
employed was the intermittent observation of hundreds of trials in the
magistrates' courts during a period beginning in 1951, supplemented by
interviews with a small sample of convicted vagrants at the House of
Correction and the compilation of statistical information from police
and House of Correction records. This method was time-consuming
and in many ways unsatisfactory, but there was no alternative, for
no stenographic notes of testimony are made at the trials, and the records
maintained by the magistrates were useless for the purpose of this
study.
It is impossible, short of a more intensive examination, to determine whether the hundreds of vagrancy, drunkenness and disorderly
conduct trials which were observed were exceptional or whether they
represent a fair sample of Philadelphia practices. It is believed, however, that the sample is representative. A number of different magis* This study was financed by a grant from the Thomas Skelton Harrison Foundation, an agency created by the will of Thomas Skelton Harrison to promote good government in Philadelphia.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. A.B., 1939, Harvard University; M.A., 1941, Columbia University; LL.B., 1953, University of Pennsylvania.
1. K NNY, OuTLims OV Tat CRIMINAL LAW 381 (15th ed. 1936).
2. 3 STPHEN, HISTORY O

THX CRIMINAL LAw OP ENGLAND 204 (1883).
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trates conducted the hearings, and while there were differences among
them, their general attitude towards and conduct of vagrancy-type cases
was remarkably similar. The fact that the observation extended from
June, 1951, through March, 1954, and that the more serious abuses in
magisterial practice so pervaded all of the observed hearings throughout
this period make it reasonable to infer that they are typical of Philadelphia practices.
While the administrative material is drawn solely from Philadelphia, the significance of the study has broader application. No comparable study has been made elsewhere, but it is probable that many
Philadelphia practices are widespread.
At a time when there is dispute as to the extent to which latitude
should be accorded police and administrative action by easing the
procedural and constitutional restrictions imposed by our criminal
law,3 the practices described in this study offer a revealing illustration
of what- happens when those restrictions are removed. Procedural
due process does not penetrate to the world inhabitated by the "bums"
of Philadelphia, and this description of what occurs in that world is
certainly relevant to the problem of how far our criminal law administration should relax constitutional and procedural controls to
permit greater administrative police discretion.

II. A

VAGRANT'S DAY IN COURT

Because the issues raised by vagrancy-type law can only be understood in the context of the law's everyday administration, examples of
typical proceedings in the Philadelphia magistrates' courts are a useful
introduction to the problem. The enforcement efforts of the police
and magistrates were conducted on a year-round basis, but from time
to time during the period of this study the tempo of enforcement was
stepped up with a well-publicized "drive" against vagrants. One of
the more recent examples was a "cleanup" to make the newly completed Independence Mall "out of bounds for undesirables," ' the theory
apparently being that the publicity would induce vagrants already in
the city to depart and would deter "undesirables" who had planned to
come to Philadelphia from enterini the city. A description of one of
these "cleanups" reveals many of the complex factors and motives that
underlie vagrancy administration.
On January 31, 1954, the Philadelphia press reported that police
had ".

.

. opened a drive against vagrants and habitual drunkards

3. See, e.g., the differences of opinion within the Supreme Court on two recently
decided cases: Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128 (1954).
4. Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 9, 1955, p. 1, col. 1.
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in the central city area." By February 2, the drive was at its height,
and that morning 56 cases were awaiting disposition when the magistrate opened the daily divisional police court for the district which included the "skid row" and the central city area. These cases were the
last items on the morning's docket, and the magistrate did not reach
them until 11:04 a.m. In one of the cases there was a private prosecutor, and the hearing of evidence consumed five minutes. As court
adjourned at 11:24, this left 15 minutes in which to hear the remaining
55 cases. During that time the magistrate discharged 40 defendants
and found 15 guilty and sentenced them to three month terms in the
House of Correction.
Four of these committed defendants were tried, found guilty and
sentenced in the elapsed time of seventeen seconds from the time that
the first man's name was called by the magistrate through the pronouncing of sentence upon the fourth defendant. In each of these cases
the magistrate merely read off the name of the defendant, took one
look at him and said, "Three months in the House of Correction." As
the third man was being led out he objected, stating, "But I'm working . .

.,"

to which the magistrate replied, "Aw, go on."

The magistrate then called the name of one defendant several times
and got no answer. Finally he said, "Where are you, Martin?" The
defendant raised his hand and answered, "Right here." "You aren't
going to be 'right here' for long," the magistrate said. "Three months
in Correction." Another defendant was called. The magistrate stated:
"I'm going to send you up for a medical examination-three months
in the House of Correction."
A number of defendants were discharged with orders to get out
of Philadelphia or to get out of the particular section of Philadelphia
where they were arrested. "What are you doing in Philadelphia?"
the magistrate asked one of these. "Just passing through." "You
get back to Norristown. We've got enough bums here without you."
Another defendant whose defense was that he was passing through town
added, "I was in the bus station when they arrested me." "Let me see
your bus ticket," the magistrate said. "The only thing that's going to
save you this morning is if you have that bus ticket. Otherwise you're
going to Correction for sure." After considerable fumbling the defendant produced a Philadelphia to New York ticket. "You better get on
that bus quick," said the magistrate, "because if you're picked up
between here and the bus station, you're a dead duck."
In discharging defendants with out-of-the-central-city addresses,
the magistrate made comments such as the following:
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"You stay out in West Philadelphia."
"Stay up in the fifteenth ward; I'll take care of you up there."
"What are you doing in this part of town? You stay where
you belong; we've got enough bums down here without you."
Near the end of the line the magistrate called a name, and after
taking a quick look said, "You're too clean to be here. You're discharged."
The next morning, the PhiladelphiaInquirerran an editorial under
the title, "Get Bums off the Street and Into Prison Cells," ' which
noted with satisfaction that three month sentences were being imposed
and that ".

.

. Chief Magistrate Clothier has threatened them with

jail sentences of two years." The editorial felt that "If they have
nothing worse to expect from the police than a warm cell to sleep it
off for the night, the vagrants will hardly be discouraged. But two
years in prison is something else again; only the most hardened bum
will take a chance on that." The editorial had no suggestions on how
one who was already a "bum" could avoid taking the chance.
The hearings that morning moved even more rapidly; between
50 and 60 defendants were handled between 10:39 and 10:54. Five
defendants were committed under the same procedure already noted,
the magistrate merely calling their names, taking one look, and then
pronouncing sentence. To another he said, "You look like one, three
months."
"Three months for you, Tom Harris," he said to a defendant.
"I'm working," the defendant replied. "Yes, I know," the magistrate
responded, "working on the Bible. Take him away, oh, and take Mr.
Gurdy here back with you for another three months."
Three other defendants alleged the defense of working. Two
were ignored, but the third kept insisting that he had a job with a
packing company. The magistrate asked him under whom he worked,
what the first name of his boss was, and finally discharged him.
"Well, what do you want to tell me?" the magistrate said to another defendant. The reply was that he was on his way to Harrisburg.
"You keep going to Harrisburg, then, and don't you stop, because if
you do, you're a dead duck." Other defendants from Camden and
Conshohocken were told to "go back where you belong."
The court room at the 12th and Pine St. police station was
jammed at these hearings. Spectators were packed in solidly behind
the railing, and the defendants, all of whom were herded out at once,
5. Id., Feb. 3, 1954, p. 30, cols. 1 & 2.
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occupied every bit of space between the rail and the bench. The noise
and confusion were continuous.
At one of the hearings floodlights were mounted behind the bench
and as the defendants were called up one by one, a photographer,
crouching just behind the magistrate, took motion pictures of the proceedings. The lights were arranged in such a way that they must
have blinded those standing in front of the magistrate; the effect was
much like that of a police line-up.6
Although the legal effect of "discharged" is that the defendant
has been found not guilty and is free to go, this was not the usual
result at these hearings. As the "discharged" defendant made his way
out of the crowded courtroom, he had to pass an officer who directed
him either to the left, which led to the hallway and the street, or to
the right, back to the cell block. Most of the acquitted were directed
to the right; only those who looked "clean" or were better dressed or
obviously physically incapable of any work were freed at once. Some
of those sent back to cells objected, but the officer would state: "Oh,
go on, some work will do you good." The detained men, whom both
police and magistrates called the "goon squad," were kept for a couple
of hours to mop and clean the building.
As the hearings progressed through February the court adopted
a new technique which governed assignments to the "goon squad."
Each defendant was asked how much he had to contribute to the
magistrate's "favorite charity." Those who dropped at least a dollar into
a collection box for the Heart Fund, which was on the desk, were
freed at once. Those who contributed something more than 25'0
were also usually exonerated. Those who were discharged but did
not contribute anything or enough were assigned to the squad.
This 1954 winter drive lasted for almost a month. Usually the
duration was shorter, and as soon as the newspaper publicity ceased,
the atmosphere at the hearings relaxed. With no drive in progress,
there were fewer spectators, a higher proportion of discharges, and the
magistrates sometimes took longer to hear the cases.
Hearings observed earlier at another court before other magistrates are illustrative of the unpublicized enforcement which went on
between drives. At the time the court was observed, it was handling
up to 1600 summary cases a month, and of necessity it worked rapidly.
6. Compare this practice with the American Bar Association's Judicial Canon 35,
as amended Sept. 15, 1952, 77 A.B.A. Rip. 110 (1952), and as adopted by the Pennsylvania Bar Association, which bans such photography because it is ".

.

. calculated

to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving
his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the
mind of the public. ..

."

(Italics omitted.)
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One of the magistrates did not even bother to hear the routine drunkenness cases; only aggravated offenders whom the police wished to have
committed were brought before him, and the other defendants were
automatically discharged without a hearing. The usual practice, however, was for the magistrate to tell an officer, "bring on the boarders,"
and for the police to herd all the vagrancy-type defendants into the
courtroom at one time, a process that was frequently accompanied by
general hilarity. The magistrate greeted his favorites with a broad
grin; the police joked with the defendants as they shoved them along;
and the loafers on the spectator's side of the railing joked about the
stench. The officer who sat with the magistrate took the night list
of arrests and called the defendants one by one. Some were still so
drunk that they could scarcely make it across the room alone, and
stood stolidly, with glazed eyes. The emaciated, gaunt, tattered appearance of some indicated both poverty and chronic alcoholism. Many
of the defendants were discharged with a brief explanation:
"George, I feel sorry for you; go on home and quit drinking."
"I haven't seen you for three weeks-discharged."
"You work, don't you? I know you. I know every one of
you. I'm around here seven days a week, 365 days a year. Now
go on and get back to work."
But there were some of the same summary convictions noted above,
where as soon as a defendant's name was called, and while he was still
making his way forward, the magistrate pronounced: "Three months in
the House of Correction," and the police hustled the convicted man back
to his cell. Presumably in these cases, listed as "drunk" on the arrest roster but as habitual drunkenness on the commitment sheet, the
test of habitualness being applied was that described by several magistrates as: "When you get sick of seeing their faces, you send them to
Correction."
Most of the Philadelphians were discharged, but one defendant
who gave a Philadelphia address was next asked, "Do you have any
proof that you live there?" "No, judge, I don't have anything with
me." "Three months in the House of Correction." As another Philadelphian, summarily given the same sentence, was led away, the magistrate remarked to one of the officers, "He doesn't belong in this district.
He ought to stay where he belongs."
Different magistrates followed different policies regarding outof-town transients. Some followed the practice of discharging outof-town defendants with a warning to leave Philadelphia immediately.
Another magistrate's invariable opening gambit was the question,
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"Where do you live ?" If the answer was anything other than a Philadelphia address, usually a three months sentence was immediately imposed.
III.

PUNISHMENT BY ANALOGY

Enough has been said to indicate the speed and informality characteristic of Philadelphia's vagrancy-type proceedings. Any legal analysis
of such cases is handicapped at the outset by the difficulty of determining what law was being applied by a magistrate in any given case,
The crimes which form the components of vagrancy-type legislation
and which were available to the magistrates as sanctions in these cases
involved the following statutes.
1. Vagrancy
At common law a vagrant is an idle person who is without visible
means of support and who, although able to work, refuses to do so.
The offense is punishable in all American jurisdictions, 7 with many
variations from and accretions upon the common-law concept. The
Pennsylvania vagrancy statute 8 defines as vagrants persons who come
from outside the state, follow no labor, are without visible means of
. reasonable account of themsupport, and are unable to give a ".
selves or their business in such place." A vagrant can be tried summarily, i.e., without the necessity for indictment or the right to a jury
trial; in Pennsylvania he can be punished with imprisonment up to six
months for the first offense and up to two years for certain subsequent
offenses.9
2. Habitual Drunkenness
This offense, sometimes called "common drunkenness," is punishable in many jurisdictions, frequently as a part of a broad vagrancy
It must be distinguished from occasional acts of intoxicastatute.'
tion, for defendants are punishable only if subject to a fixed habit of
drunkenness, such as that of one who is drunk "one-half of his time.""
7. By statute in all states except West Virginia, where it is a common-law crime.
City of Huntington v. Salyer, 135 W.Va. 397, 63 S.E.2d 575 (1951); see Ex parte
Hudgins, 86 W.Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920).
8. A.t.STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2032 (Purdon 1945). The penalty provided by this act
is not less than 30 days or more than 6 months. Id. § 2033.
9. By the House of Correction Act, imprisonment of up to 1 year for a first offender and 2 years for repeaters is provided. Id. tit. 61, §§ 672, 681 (Purdon 1930). See
also the statute proscribing the offense of tramping. Id. tit. 18, § 4617 (Purdon 1945);
no use of this statute was observed during this study.

10. E.g., ALA.CoDm ANN. tit. 14, § 437 (1940).
11. Ludwick v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 172, 175 (1851); see Commonwealth v.
Whitney, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 85 (1855)

(reversing conviction for being a common

drunkard where proof showed only three instances of intoxication within six months).
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The Pennsylvania law on this point is ambiguous, and under very
questionable authority, Philadelphia police and magisterial practice assumes that habitual drunkenness is a crime subject to the same penalty
as vagrancy. Pennsylvania explicitly makes criminal only the lesser
offense of intoxication, which proscribes a single act of drunkenness
and which is punishable by a fine of either 670 12 or $5,13 but not by
imprisonment. The only authority for imposing prison sentences for
drunkenness is found in the statute establishing the House of Correction,
which provides that the institution shall be the place of imprisonment
for "all persons, adults or minors, that may hereafter be convicted,
according to the laws of this commonwealth .

.

. as a vagrant, drunk-

ard, or disorderly streetwalker." "4 This statute is merely concerned
with the treatment of offenders convicted under other laws and does
not purport to create the crime of being a "drunkard."
3. DisorderlyConduct
The Pennsylvania statute is typical: "Whoever wilfully makes or
causes to be made any loud, boisterous and unseemly noise or disturbance to the annoyance of the peaceable residents nearby, or near to
any public highway [or other public place], whereby the public peace
is broken or disturbed or the traveling public annoyed .

.

."

is guilty

of disorderly conduct and is punishable upon conviction in a summary
proceeding with a fine not exceeding $10, or, in default of payment
of the fine, with imprisonment not exceeding thirty days."
Pennsylvania also has a pickpocket statute, 6 which could be used
against vagrancy-type defendants, but no prosecutions under this statute
were observed. The state has not enacted a "public enemy" law proscribing the association of known criminals for an unlawful purpose. 7
Thus vagrancy, habitual drunkenness and, to a lesser extent, disorderly
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1523 (Purdon 1945).

13. Id. tit. 47, § 722 (Purdon 1952).
14. The basis of the practice is the House of Correction Act. Id. tit. 61, §§ 672,
681 (Purdon 1930). The only authority for punishing anyone as an habitual drunkard,
therefore, would be under the statute preserving common-law offenses, id. tit. 18, § 5101
(Purdon 1945), which would apply if habitual drunkenness were an offense at common law. This question has never been decided by Pennsylvania courts, but other jurisdictions have held that it is not. Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 583
(1863) ; State v. Munger, 43 Wyo. 404, 4 P.2d 1094 (1931) ; see State v. Hunter, 106
N.C. 796, 11 S.E. 366 (1890); see also 2 BROOM AND HADLEY, COMIMENTARIES 446
(Wait ed. 1875) (intoxication not an indictable offense at common law, although common drunkenness sometimes treated as a public nuisance).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4406 (Purdon 1945).
16. Id. § 4821, providing a punishment of not more than 90 days or a peace bond

for not more than one year.

17. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :170-1 (1953).

1956]

VAGRANCY-TYPE LAW

conduct were the important working tools of the police in the cases
observed.
Even within these .narrow confines, however, it was not easy to
determine which statute was being applied in any given case. The
police roster of arrests, which the magistrates used as a docket, listed
the charge entered by the arresting officer and also provided a space
for the officer to note whether the arrestee was drunk or sober on arrest.
In no observed hearing, however, was this charge read to the defendant. Occasionally it was clear that the magistrate was proceeding
against a defendant as an habitual drunkard, as where the testimony
indicated that he was a repeated offender and no issue of transient
status was involved. Sometimes when imposing sentence, the magistrate for the first time would tell the defendant the crime with which
he was charged. An example was a case where the police charge
was "drunk" and where the trial of the defendant consisted of the
following exchange:
Magistrate: "Where do you live?"
Defendant: "Norfolk."
Magistrate: "What are you doing in Philadelphia ?"
Defendant: "Well, I didn't have any work down there, so
I came up here to see if I could find . .. .
Magistrate (who had been shaking his head) : "That story's
not good enough for me. I'm going to have you investigated.
You're a vagrant. Three months in the House of Correction."
During one month in one police district there were 1125 arrests
for summary offenses; 139 of these defendants were sentenced to three
months, and five were sentenced to six months. Of these commitments,
the police arrest records charged 57 with "habitual drunk," 50 with
"drunk," 27 with "vagrancy," five with "drunk and vagrant," two with
"drunk and panhandling," two with "disorderly conduct," and one
with "drunk and disorderly." Most of these cases were observed, and
in many of them it was impossible to determine what crime the magistrate had in mind when the sentence was imposed. Some of those
arrested merely as "drunk" were habitual offenders, and some charged
with "habitual drunk" had apparently never been in Philadelphia before
and therefore could not have been known to the police as habitual anythings. A number of those listed as "drunk" and committed as "habitual
drunk" were apparently being punished for something unrelated to their
intoxication,. the magistrate imposing sentence because the defendant
was not "where you belong."
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Where conviction can be obtained by sight and smell alone, it
makes little practical difference what charge is listed in the records,
and it was apparent that police and magistrates frequently used these
offenses interchangeably. The definition of vagrancy and the fact of
drunkenness are regarded as merely illustrative of a mode of life which
is to be suppressed. The vagrancy statute describes what is commonly
known as a "bum"; so, by analogy, any bum is punishable, whether or
not his acts amount to the legal definition of vagrancy or habitual
drunkenness. Add to this the fact that most "vagrants" also appeared
to be chronic alcoholics and that most alcoholics meet the generous
magisterial definition of vagrancy, and the compounding and confusion
of the statutes is understandable.
Such loose administration was not restricted by the technical elements of a crime. Conviction as an habitual drunkard required no
proof beyond simple intoxication. Many Philadelphia residents were
committed as vagrants under a statute limiting that crime to non-residents who have come "from without the Commonwealth." Many
out-of-state vagrancy defendants were not allowed to give an explanation of their presence in Philadelphia, although the statute provides
that it shall be a defense. These problems of proof will be considered
in more detail below.
Such administration explains two curious anomalies found in
police and prison records. One is the fact that in 1950 in Philadelphia
there were 1430 commitments of vagrants to the House of Correction,
but only 1241 arrests for that offense." As a number of those arrested
for vagrancy were discharged-over 40 per cent by one sample tabulation ' 9 -the discrepancy is substantial. The excess of convictions over
arrests doubtless resulted from the method of recruiting the ranks of
vagrants in part from those arrested and brought before the magistrates merely as drunks. Second, the records of habitual offenders at
the House of Correction frequently showed vagrancy convictions interspersed among commitments as habitual drunkards, which under the
Pennsylvania law would be legally impossible. This interchangeable
use of the two offenses is illustrated by the record of an inmate interviewed in the summer of 1951:
18. PHILA. HousE oF CoRRcTIoN,
POLICE, ANN. REP. table 1 (1950).

ANN.

RtP. 42 (1950);

PHILA.

BUREAU

OF

19. Philadelphia 6th Police District, June 1951. Arrests for vagrancy, 46, of whom
20 discharged and 26 committed. Arrests for "drunk and vagrant," 7, of whom 2 discharged and 5 committed. But for drunkenness the proportion of discharges was very
high. There were 850 arrests for "drunkenness," of whom 51 were committed; 89 arrests for "habitual drunkenness," of whom 57 were committed; thus a total of 108 out
of 939 drunkenness arrests were committed.
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Committed
6/ 4/47
12/22/47
4/ 9/48
8/ 7/49
10/31/49
1/ 4/50
3/25/50
9/ 2/50
11/10/50
1/31/51
5/24/51
8/12/51

.

Charge
Vagrancy
Vagrancy
Vagrancy
Hab. Drunk.
Hab. Drunk.
Vagrancy
Hab. Drunk.
Hab. Drunk.
Vagrancy
Vagrancy
Vagrancy
Vagrancy

Sentence
6 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
6 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
3 months
3 months

Discharged
12/ 4/47
3/9/48
6/25/48
10/25/49
12/30/49
3/22/50
6/21/50
9/25/50
1/26/51
4/18/51
8/10/51

IV. POLICY OBJECTIVES OF VAGRANCY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Philadelphia magistrates observed during this study frequently
expressed the policies which guided their administration of vagrancytype law. They viewed their function as a deterrent one to banish
"bums" from Philadelphia and keep them out ("After this you stay
where you belong"), or as a form of civic sanitation ("I'll clean up this
district if I have to stay here until 5 o'clock every afternoon"), or as
control of suspicious persons ("There have been a lot of robberies
around here. I'm going to have you investigated-three months"),
or as humanitarian ("I'm saving his life by sending him where he can't
booze").
The wide scope of these policy objectives illustrates the important
place of vagrancy-type law in our criminal administration. The acts
which are made punishable are petty in terms of social dangerousness,
but the chief significance of this branch of the criminal law lies in its
quantitative impact and administrative usefulness. More persons are
arrested for vagrancy proper than for any of the more serious offenses
except possibly larceny and assault,' and it is quite likely that more
persons are convicted for this offense than for any other.2 Add the
20. Arrests for vagrancy between 1940 and 1946 ranged between 5.7% and 8.8%
of all arrests tabulated in the Uniform Crine Reports. Major categories in 1945

were: drunkenness (22.9%), larceny (9.2%), assault (7.9%),

disorderly conduct

(7.0%) and vagrancy (6.2%). Of all arrests in that year, 6.6% were for "suspicion,"
and no other charge was ever made. UNWORM CRIME RIPORTS (U.S. Dep't of Justice)
for the years indicated: 1951 at 105; 1950 at 107; 1949 at 112; 1948 at 114; 1947 at
115; 1946 at 116; 1945 at 113; 1944 at 91; 1943 at 87; 1942 at 86; 1941 at 203; 1940

at 204.
21. This may result because (1) the overwhelming number of those arrested for
drunkenness are probably merely discharged, and (2) many persons arrested for vagrancy, including many in Philadelphia, were not tabulated in these reports because
they were not fingerprinted.
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related offenses of drunkenness and disorderly conduct, and vagrancytype crime accounts for more than one third of all arrests tabulated in
the Uniform Crime Reports. 2 Then there are the countless additional
arrests made for these offenses which are never recorded with the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
Administratively, vagrancy-type statutes are regarded as essential
criminal preventives, providing a residual police power to facilitate
the arrest, investigation and incarceration of suspicious persons. When
the District of Columbia vagrancy law was revised ten years ago, Congress was told by police officials ".

. that one of the principal needs

to assist in correcting the existing criminal situation in the District of
Columbia is the strengthening of the existing vagrancy law." 24 In
most jurisdictions these statutes are sufficiently indefinite to give the
police wide scope. They permit arrest without warrant and summary
prosecution without jury before a justice of the peace or magistrate, and
often simplify the problem of proof by placing on the defendant the
burden of at least going forward with evidence of innocence. To the
extent that the police actually are hampered by the restrictions of the
ordinary law of arrest,25"- by the illegality of arrests on mere suspicion
alone,2 6 and by the defects and loopholes of substantive criminal law,
vagrancy-type statutes facilitate the apprehension, investigation or
harassment of suspected criminals. When suspects can be arrested for
nothing else, it is often possible to "go and vag them." 27
This usefulness as a criminal catch-all is not confined to its effectiveness against criminal suspects. Perhaps its principal employment
is as a clean-up measure in dealing with the problems of congested urban
"skid row" districts. Unwanted drunkards, panhandlers, gamblers,
peddlers or paupers are committed or banished, a procedure that is
alleged to deter other like persons from entering or remaining in a given
locality. Miscellaneous problems in practice are embraced Within its
broad scope; during the period of this study in Philadelphia, vagrancy
22. The combined arrests for vagrancy, disorderly conduct, drunkenness and suspicion constituted the following proportion of all arrests for the years indicated: 1951,
39.4%; 1950, 40.2%; 1949, 41.8%; 1948, 42.8%; 1947, 43.1%; 1946, 42.6%; 1945,
42.7%; 1944, 42.6%; 1943, 45.3%. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, op. cit. supra note 20.
23. Statistics in the Uniform Crine Reports are based on fingerprints registered
with the F.B.I., and in respect to offenses such as vagrancy and drunkenness, they are
incomplete to a degree which cannot be ascertained. In Philadelphia, when this field
study was made, such persons were not fingerprinted on arrest, and only a few of those
convicted were fingerprinted at the House of Correction; thus the great majority were
not included in the F.B.I.'s statistics.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1248, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941).
25. See Note, PhiladelphiaPolice Practiceand the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L.
Rgv. 1182 (1952).
26. Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229, 48 L.R.A. 220 (1900).
27. People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 47, 91 Pac. 997, 1000 (1907).
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convictions were used at least twice to imprison unsuccessful would-be
suicides and repeatedly as a means of commitment of mentally ill
persons.
It is somewhat incongruous that these modem and peculiarly urban
problems are dealt with by statutes created centuries ago to meet the
utterly dissimilar problems of a rural England faced with the break-up
of feudalism and its resulting economic dislocation. The basic elements
of the Pennsylvania vagrancy statute merely repeat legislation enacted
400 years ago in the immediate aftermath of the Black Death. Despite
the drastic change in social and economic conditions that has intervened,
there is striking similarity between the policy objectives of modern
vagrancy law administration and of the pre-Elizabethan Parliaments.
1. Banishment of Unwanted Persons
Feudal Background
The anti-migratory policy behind vagrancy legislation began as
an essential complement of the wage stabilization legislation which
accompanied the break-up of feudalism and the depopulation caused by
the Black Death. By the Statutes of Laborers in 1349-51, every ablebodied person without other means of support was required to work for
wages fixed at the level preceding the Black Death; it was unlawful to
accept more, or to refuse an offer of work, or to flee from one county
to another to avoid offers of work or seek higher wages,28 or to give
alms to able-bodied beggars who refused to work.29 By a later act,
the penalties of branding, slavery and death were to be inflicted even
upon those unable to get work for wages who ".

.

. do not offer

themself to work for meate and drynk."3 0 The Act of 1414, noting
that laborers were continuing to flee from county to county ".

.

. to

the great damage of gentlemen and others to whom they should serve
." sought to tighten up enforcement by giving justices of the peace
the summary power to punish vagrants which they have exercised
ever since.31
This attempt to make the vagrancy statutes a substitute for serfdom
by tying workers to their jobs was an economic failure. Lack of work
or wretched working conditions continually forced laborers onto the
road, and until
28. 25 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1350-51). For a summary of these statutes, see 3 STrFPHEN,
a compilation, see
1906).

HISTORY Or THx CRIMINAL LAW Or ENGLAND 203-06 (1883). For
DEPARTMiNTAL CoMIrrTIM ON VAGRANCY, RzroR'r app. 1 (London

29. 23 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1349).
30. 1 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1547).

31. 2 Hen. 5, c. 4 (1414).
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the middle of the 17th Century, and indeed, although in

diminishing degree right down to the reform of the poor law in
the first half of the 19th century, the roads of England were
crowded with masterless men and their families, who had lost
their former employment through a variety of causes, had no
means of livelihood, and had taken to a vagrant life." 3
These conditions changed the emphasis of the anti-migratory policy
from required work at a fixed abode to protection of the countryside
against the financial burden, nuisance and potential criminality of the
vagrant class. The ban upon migration became a preventive to keep a
parish, which had the responsibility of providing relief for local needy
residents, from being burdened with the annoyance and economic liability of foreign paupers and idlers. The laws were accordingly drawn
to confine those unable to work to their own parish; if they wandered,
they were liable to punishment and compulsory removal to the parish
which was legally bound to support them. Those who refused to work
although able to do so were viewed with hostile eyes, not only because
of the suspicion they aroused but as a potential relief burden.
This policy was carried over to this country, some vagrancy statutes dating from colonial times. "Paupers" and "vagabonds" were
excepted from the privileges and immunities clause of the Articles of
Confederation and from its guarantee of ".

.

.

free ingress and egress

to and from any other state." " In City of New York v. Miln,"4 the
Supreme Court noted that it is ".

.

. as competent and as necessary

for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts, as it is to guard
against the physical pestilence. .

.

."

During the depression some

states established "border patrols" to keep out unwanted migrants,"3
and statutes for this purpose were adopted in twenty-seven states prior
37
to 1940,"6 when they were declared unconstitutional.
32. Scott, L.J., in Ledwith v. Roberts, 11936] 3 All E.R. 570, 585, 594 (C.A.).
"The main causes were the gradual decline of the feudal system under which the labouring classes had been anchored to the soil, the economic slackening of the legal
compulsion to work for fixed wages, the breakup of the monasteries in the reign of
Henry VII, and the consequent disappearance of the religious orders which had previously administered a kind of public assistance in the form of lodging, food and alms;
and lastly the economic changes brought about by the Enclosure Acts." Ibid.
33. "The free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several States, and the people of each State shall have free ingress and
egress to and from any other State." Article IV (Emphasis added). AmmarcAN's GUIDE
See Note, DepressionMigrants and the States, 53
AND CON s rTUTIONS 554 (1855).
HAv. L. Rv. 1031, 1036 n.34 (1940).
34. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 143 (1837).
35. See Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 HAgv. L. Rev. 1031, 1034

(1940).
36. Id. at 1033.
37. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). See discussion in text at notes

60-64 infra.
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It is incongruous that this Elizabethan and pre-Elizabethan antimigratory policy should have been imposed in a country where mobility
of population has played a role of such historic and economic importance. Vast movements of people motivated by urgent economic need
settled this country from Europe, pushed settlement westward and fed
growing cities from rural population reservoirs. England's Enclosure
Acts, by withdrawing land from agricultural use, swelled the army of
English vagrants; America invited migration with the lure of free
land. The same elements of the population who on one side of the
Atlantic were rogues and vagabonds, on the other were frontiersmen.
Nor are such migrations ended, although there is no longer a frontier
for a shock-absorber. Negroes moving out of the South and farmers
driven out of the Great Plains Dust Bowl are two recent examples, and
vagrancy law and its anti-migratory philosophy has exerted substantial
if inconclusive deterrent weight against both.
The most important factor which contributes to migration of persons in the lower economic brackets today is the need for transient labor
resulting from the mechanization of agriculture. Between 1931 and
1949, the proportion of farm workers who were needed twelve months
a year declined from 46 per cent to 19 per cent, and the proportion of
workers needed two months or less rose from 11 per cent to 27 per
cent. 8 In 1950, agricultural employment ranged from a December
low of 6.7 million persons to a September high of 13.7 million. 9 Migratory workers are essential to meet these fluctuating demands, and
this labor supply is drawn of necessity from the lowest economic strata
of society. These facts dramatize the absurdity of applying preElizabethan anti-migratory policy to the America of the nineteenfifties.
Philadelphia's Banishment Policy
This fifteenth century policy objective of erecting barriers against
the wanderings of the poor and of banishment of those who were found
where they were not supposed to be retains surprising vitality in present day Philadelphia vagrancy administration. Any migrant, whether
a transient en route between jobs, or stopping over to spend the proceeds of one job before moving on to the next, or arriving in a city
destitute and planning to stay there while seeking employment, is bait
for a vagrancy arrest.4" He tends to gravitate to the skid row in any
38. PRtSIDZNT'S COMMISSION ON MIGRATORY LAOR, RPORT 12 (1950).
39. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on S. 949,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1951). See Tyson, Migratory Labor-Some Legal, Social and
Ecoto~ic Aspects,3 Mracim L. Rzv. 278 (1952).
40. See Bower v. State, 135 N.J.L. 564, 53 A.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1947) : "It is not
an offense to have a dirty face, or to wear blue overalls or to travel by gratuitous
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city through which he passes, if only because that is where 50 beds
can be obtained, and he can patronize the bars, walk the streets, or sit
on a park bench on a warm summer night. Some, but by no means exclusively the drinkers, 4 get scooped up in the nightly rounds of clean-up
arrests. They constituted a small but significant minority of the drunkenness and vagrancy prosecutions observed in this study. In the magistrates' courts their defense of recent employment or search for employment was viewed with such extreme suspicion that it was very
difficult to establish.
Some examples will illustrate the operation of the anti-migratory
policy in Philadelphia. On a July morning after one of the hottest
nights of the summer, a group of defendants were brought before a
Philadelphia magistrate. A police officer checked the record of arrests
and said: "These men were arrested sleeping in Reyburn Plaza at 2:20
a.m." The arresting officers were not present, and there were no other
witnesses.
The magistrate took them one by one, first asking each one,
"Where are you from ?" If the answer was Philadelphia, the defendant was discharged with a warning not to sleep outdoors in a park
again.
In each case where the defendant's answer revealed an out-of-city
residence, even when the defendant tried to say more, the magistrate
immediately concluded the hearing with, "You can't sleep in the parks.
Three months in the House of Correction." The commitment sheets
showed that these men were convicted of vagrancy.
A number of American jurisdictions have emulated the British
statute which prohibits what has been called the "scandal" 42 of "sleeping in .

.

. the open air" by persons "who can give no good account

of themselves." " Pennsylvania does not have this statutory provision. Thus, its enforcement can only be described as punishment by
rides from Bangor, Maine, to Florida, or to sleep in a truck, or to pick potatoes in one
part of the country or, with $14 in pocket, to be temporarily out of employment on the
way from completion of one job to the search for another." The conviction of this defendant, arrested under the circumstances described, was reversed; but in vagrancy
such a rare appeal may very well indicate arrest practices which continue despite a decision. "Typically, the policemen are given little information about the laws they are
required to enforce, and they are usually unaware of appellate decisions that affect the
meaning of those laws whose texts they may have read." Note, 59 YALn L.. 1351,

1357 (1950).
41. Inthe 6th police district in June, 1951, 18 of 46 vagrancy arrests were listed
as "sober" and 28 "drunk" on arrest.
42. DXPARTBIENTAL COMMITTE ON VAGRANCY, REPORT 326 (London 1906).
43. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAr. § 8644 (1949) ;DEL. Cone ANN. tit.
11, § 881 (1953);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302(6) (Supp. 1949); MASs. ANN. LAws c. 272, § 66 (1933);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :170-4 (1952) ;N.Y.PsN. CoD- § 887(6).
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analogy, and in any case, the "good account" proviso is essential unless the offense is to include boy scouts, naturalists or persons taking
44
a nap under a tree on a hot day.

The convicted defendants were subsequently interviewed in the
House of Correction. A and B stated that they were staying in skid
row hotels while visiting Philadelphia, and it was so hot that they went
out to sit in the park and fell asleep. A declared, "The next thing I
knew they were kicking me in the shins and told me to get into the
wagon."
A middle aged man, C, reported that he worked nine months a
year in a cotton seed oil processing plant in Virginia, where he had a
wife and three children, and that during the seasonal shut-down of the
plant he worked as an agricultural migrant. He alleged that he had
worked on a New Jersey farm on the day of his arrest, came in to visit
Philadelphia in the evening on the labor contractor's truck, had some
drinks and missed the truck back. He said he went to the bus station
to wait for the first early morning bus, but it was so hot there that he
retreated to the park and was arrested.
D and E were Negro youths of about 20. D said he was en route
from New York, where he had been working, to his home in Mississippi; he arrived in Philadelphia by bus in the evening and wanted to
stay over to look around and see a friend. They lounged in the bus
station for a while, walked up Market Street, decided against taking in
an all night movie, and ended up on the park bench. D had $25 on his
person at the time of his arrest to finance his trip to Mississippi.'
All of these defendants were listed as "sober" when arrested, and none
of them fitted the stereotype of "bum."
Transient types observed during the study included: (1) agricultural migrants, like C in the above example; (2) men who alleged
they had just come to Philadelphia hoping to stay and find employment,
like the Virginian noted above; (3) men who alleged that they had
stopped in Philadelphia to visit friends or "to see the sights" (To one
of the latter a magistrate said: "I'll show you some sights-three
months in the House of Correction") ; and (4) one non-resident seaman. This man was interviewed at the House of Correction. He said
he had come off a ship with $175, which he proceeded to spend in a
44. But see CoNN. GIN. S rAT. § 8644 (1949) (vagrants include "all persons camping on the public highway without the consent of the selectmen of the town or on private property without the consent of the owner. . . .") ; see also Wis. STAT. § 348.351
(1953), as amended, Wis. LAws 1951, c. 332 (no "good account" exception).
45. At the House of Correction it was later confirmed that C had a Virginia residence, wife and children, and that D was from Mississippi. Police records confirmed
D's claim to have had $25 on him at the time of his arrest.
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week-long binge. About the third time he appeared before a magistrate, he was committed.
When the transient defendant is allowed to have his say before
the magistrate, the defenses he advances are often difficult to substantiate. One who alleges that he has been working in New York and
is en route to Baltimore to get a job has no practical way of proving
either statement. Nor is it reasonable to expect a defendant who claims
that he is seeking work in Philadelphia to produce as witnesses the
men who have turned him down for a job. Under the pressure of
time and mass production in the magistrates' courts, questions of proof
are greatly simplified. One defendant stated that he was from Trenton,
New Jersey, and that he was in Philadelphia looking for work. "Why
didn't you get work in Trenton?" "I tried. I was registered with the
Employment Service there, but I didn't get anything so I came down
here." He was then committed. When interviewed later, he said
that he had intended to register with the U.S. Employment Service
in Philadelphia, but had not had a chance, because he had been arrested
within a few hours after his arrival.
One morning two men who had been arrested as intoxicated but
whom the magistrate was apparently trying as transients, and therefore
for vagrancy, told similar stories. The first claimed that he had come
from Richmond en route to New York and had stopped to see a girl
friend. The second alleged that he had come from Baltimore to pick up
some laundry which he had forgotten to take with him after a previous
visit here. There was no prosecution evidence in either case except the
fact of arrest. The first man was committed for three months as a vagrant; the second, the magistrate discharged with these words: "You
get your laundry and be on your way to Baltimore by two o'clock this
afternoon. If you're picked up here again you'll g 6 to Correction."
After the hearing the magistrate distinguished the cases, explaining that after years of experience on the bench one becomes a pretty
good judge of men. "Some people, you look at them, you know they're
lying." But this simple and time-saving substitute for direct examination, cross-examination and impeachment occasionally backfired. One
such case was that of a young man who claimed he both lived and
worked in Philadelphia but was without identification. The magistrate
gave him a half minute of quizzical study and sentenced him to six
months. Half an hour later, as the prisoners were being loaded into the
van and the magistrate was picking up his papers, a man who turned
out to be the defendant's employer came in and substantiated the defendant's story. The defendant was brought back from the van, the
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magistrate tore up the commitment sheet he had signed and gave a
discharge.4
A defendant whose employer did not thus seek him out was not
so fortunate. He was a 21-year old Indian arrested intoxicated late
at night by railroad police in Broad Street Station, and he was found
to have a knife concealed on his person." This trial was not observed,
but when interviewed the defendant stated that the following proceedings took place: the magistrate asked him where he was from, and he
replied with his Philadelphia address. "I mean, where are you from
originally." "Oklahoma." "You're a vagrant. One year in the House
of Correction." This defendant claimed that he was not allowed to
telephone anyone before the hearing commenced, that when he tried
to say something more at the hearing he was grabbed by two officers
and dragged back to his cell, and that not until he had been at the House
of Correction for several days was he allowed to contact anyone. He
stated that he had come to Philadelphia a month before, that he was
employed in a photographic supply store on Market Street, and that
the reason he had a knife (which he said was "nothing but a small
penknife") was because he used it in his work. The employer confirmed this man's story, stated that he was a good worker and that
when he had learned what had happened, he had gone to see the magistrate who refused to do anything.
The exclusionary policy was often applied in cases of acquittal,
with defendants being discharged on the sole condition that they get
out of Philadelphia. To one who said he had come to Philadelphia for
a week's visit, the magistrate said, "You cut your week short and get
out today." A defendant, who said he was from Trenton, declared
that he had come to Philadelphia to see a friend. "You were panhandling, too, weren't you?" "Oh no, judge." "Well, let me warn
you. Don't come back here again, or you go up to Correction. No
more panhandling. Discharged." As the defendant left, the police
officer who served as the magistrate's "clerk" called after him: "You go
back up to Trenton. You do your panhandling up there, see?"
Some of the cases which have been discussed indicate that magisterial anti-migratory policy was not confined to transients but was used
46. "It shall be unlawful for any magistrate to (a) Review, alter, modify or remit
any sentence of fine or imprisonment imposed by him...." PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 1144 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
47. Id. tit. 18, §'4416 (Purdon 1945) provides that "Whoever carries any...
deadly weapon, concealed upon his person, with the intent therewith unlawfully and
inaliciously to do injury to any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor ...

"

(Em-

phasis added.) This defendant, however, was not charged with this offense and in view
of his explanation for carrying the knife (supra), it is probable that he could not
have been convicted under it.
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to deter intra-city travel. A very small minority of Philadelphians arrested in the skid row district but resident in another part of the city
were convicted, the magistrate remarking, "He should stay where he
belongs." More often there were discharges with a warning to "keep
away from this district."
Even the statutory and administrative release procedures were
geared to this policy of banishment. A statute (which was apparently
in disuse) provides that upon release of a vagrant, he shall be given a
certificate of discharge ". . . which shall exempt him from any further arrest for vagrancy for a period of five days upon condition that he
shall forthwith leave the county wherein confined ..
. ,, 48 Banishment was also enforced as a condition of an informal "parole" given
some vagrancy inmates at the House of Correction in 1951. At that
time some of the transients who were committed as vagrants were
visited by a probation officer of the Municipal Court. If their residence
claims in other states were confirmed and they either had or could obtain funds to finance a bus ticket home, they were taken before a Municipal Court judge and given parole on condition that they go straight
home.4" The probation officer accompanied them to the bus terminal
to make sure that they really left.
One possibly important aspect of anti-migratory policy cannot
be evaluated on the information available in this study. It was reported
that some vagrant-type defendants were threatened with arrest for
vagrancy, but were let off by the police officer with a warning to get
out of town. This practice has been recommended as a means whereby
vagrancy law could be enforced "at the least possible expense to the
taxpayer," " but there is no way of testing the frequency with which
it occurs.
Validity of Banishment Sanction
In one of the earliest criminal prosecutions on American soil, the
penalty inflicted upon Ann Hutchinson in 1637 was to be ". . . banished from out of our jurisdiction as being a woman not fit for our
society . . .,
51 and in 1800, a legislative imposition of banishment
2
was upheld.
Whether or not a legislature today has the constitu48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2042 (Purdon 1945).

49. This type of parole appears to have no statutory authority, and the procedures
followed have since been changed.
50. Commonwealth v. Dean, 19 Pa. Dist. 534 (Bradford County C.P. 1909).
"In most cases those who are in fact vagrants if notified by officers to leave the vicinity or suffer arrest would immediately take their departure." Id. at 537.
51. Quoted in DoUGLAS, AN ALMANAC op LmERTv 135 (1954).
52. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800) upheld a Georgia statute banishing from the state named persons who had sided with England during the Revo-
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tional power to impose such a punishment may be open to question, 53
but it is agreed that in the absence of express legislative authority,
a sentence which includes banishment is void.54 No Pennsylvania
statute authorizes banishment as a punishment for crime. Technically
the orders by which magistrates banish defendants in Philadelphia are
not sentences, for a discharge is given upon condition that the defendant leave the city or a particular district within the city. The result
is the same, however, as the "floating sentence" outlawed in a California
case in which a two year sentence was suspended on condition that the
defendant leave the county and stay away for two years,' 5 and in the
New York case where execution of sentence was stayed for 24 hours
If* '
to give the defendant a chance to leave Town and not come
back." " Certainly the policy reasons against banishment which have
been stressed by the courts apply in full force to Philadelphia practices.
It is no solution to the problem posed by the urban derelict to pass
him back and forth from one jurisdiction to another,5 7 and if, as seems
highly likely, other jurisdictions are doing the same thing, such a
policy is ultimately self-defeating."'
A more basic concern is the fact that the anti-migratory policy
of vagrancy administration squarely contravenes the right of persons
to travel freely from state to state. While the Supreme Court once
said in City of New York v. Miln that it is ".
. as competent and
as necessary for a State to provide precautionary measures against
the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts, as
it is to guard against physical pestilence . . . ," that 1837 decision
lution. Justice Cushing said: "The right to confiscate and banish, in the case of an
offending citizen, must belong to every government. It is not within the judicial power,
as created and regulated by the Constitution of Georgia; and it, naturally, as well as
tacitly, belongs to the Legislature." Id. at 19.
53. It has been suggested that today such legislative action might be banned as
cruel and unusual punishment. People v. Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (Suffclk
County Ct. 1953).
54. It re Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (1946) ; Ex parte Baum,
251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930) ; State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E.2d 922
(1953) ; People v. Wallace, supra note 53; State v. Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501
(1900). See Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (dictum) ; United
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269 (1905) (dissenting opinion). However, it has been
held that a pardon conditioned on banishment is valid. Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49
(10th Cir. 1930); see Comment, 31 MiNN. L. REv. 742, 743 (1947).
55. In re Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (1946).
56. People v. Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (Suffolk County Ct. 1953).
57. In State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 371, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1953), the court
noted that "It is not favorable to him to force him to go for two years into another
state, where the state of North Carolina can exercise no restraining influence upon him
for purposes of reformation."
58. Compare the prediction of the Michigan Supreme Court that banishment of
criminals "would tend to . . . provoke retaliation." Ex parte Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231
N.W. 95 (1930).
59. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837).
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has little validity in view of Edwards v. California.' There the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute which banned importing
indigent persons into a state. The majority rested their decision on
the statute's repugnance to the commerce power; three Justices applied
the privileges and immunities clause; and one Justice thought the statute
void under both clauses.0 ' The majority pointed out that ". . . the
theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fits the facts" and
specifically repudiated Miln: "Whatever may have been the notion
then prevailing, we do not think that it will be seriously contended
that because a person is without employment and without funds he
constitutes a 'moral pestilence.' "62
Yet a major part of Philadelphia's vagrancy administration rests
on just such a contention. Cases were repeatedly observed in which
"because a person is without employment and without funds," conviction resulted. However the Edwards case is viewed, it clearly bans
restrictions against persons whose interstate travel is for any lawful
purpose. The inevitable effect of vagrancy statutes is to impede such
travel, and Philadelphia practice accentuates this by its conscious effort
to deport persons who are chiefly undesirable because of their poverty,
and to deter such persons from coming to the city. The Pennsylvania
statute is particularly vulnerable under the Edwards case because
it singles out interstate migrants and limits vagrants to those who have
come from without the state.' But the Philadelphia practice and the
statutes of other jurisdictions which also embrace intrastate migration within vagrancy would also seem to be invalid under the Edwards
policy. A state cannot allow a migrant to enter but then restrict his
freedom of movement; the freedom to enter the state of one's choice
is more than the freedom to be sent to a restricted ghetto. 4
60. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
61. Despite the failure of the majority to expressly rule on the privileges and
immunities point in Edwards v. California, it seems to be well established that the
right to enter and reside in any state of one's choice is a right arising "out of the nature and essential character of the national government." Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 97 (1908). Before the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the Court invalidated a Nevada tax on persons leaving that state as inconsistent with the right
incident to national citizenship to travel across the country without restriction. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). The Third Circuit sustained an injunction to restrain the police from exporting C.I.O. organizers from Jersey City on the
grounds that freedom of movement between states is protected by the privileges and
immunities clause. Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939) ; see also Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (fourteenth amendment includes right "to live
and work where he will"). "If national citizenship means less than this, it means nothing." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (concurring opinion of Justice

Jackson).
62. 314 U.S. at 174, 177.
63. See note 8 supra.
64. "Individuals coming into or going about a city upon their lawful concerns
must be allowed free locomotion upon the streets and public places." Hague v. CIO,
101 F.2d 774, 780 (3d Cir. 1939).
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2. Suspicion
We have seen that in Philadelphia many vagrant-type defendants
are banished merely because their poverty--often but not always combined with alcoholism-makes them aesthetically undesirable on the
city's streets and parks, a practice which carries out the Poor Law
policy that pauperism alone is sufficient reason to compel people to
"stay where they belong." There is, however, a second important
factor involved in the policy of exclusion, banishment and control of
vagrant-type defendants. It has been thought that the circumstances
under which vagrant-type defendants are frequently apprehended are
sufficiently suspicious to raise a reasonable inference that criminal conduct other than vagrancy or drunkenness is involved. It is important
to note that two quite different kinds of suspicion are involved. The
alleged vagrant may be suspected of past criminality, the arrest for
vagrancy offering the opportunity to investigate whether the suspect
is wanted in another jurisdiction or has committed other crimes.6 5 On
the other hand, the suspicion may be of future criminality,the inference
being that purposeful poverty is likely to lead to other crimes unless
the state steps in.
The commonest judicial explanation of vagrancy's place in
a penal code is based on the second of these assumptions. The traditional view expressed in cases and texts is that the vagrant mode of
life denounced by the statutes is of itself a crime breeder and the vagrant "the chrysalis of every species of criminal." 66 This view appears
very early in vagrancy's legislative history,6 7 and courts have continued
to echo the preamble of a pre-Elizabethan statute that ". . . idleness and vagabondry is the mother and root of all thefts, robberies,
688. Vagrancy statutes
and all evil acts, and other mischiefs ..
are viewed as "police regulations to prevent crime," 69 to check the
spread of "a parasitic disease" " which is not only evil in itself but
65. For a recent example of this see, the following news item: "Tony Labandeira, 35, was released from the Dawes County jail Monday morning after serving
a 10-day sentence for vagrancy during which he was questioned about the rape-slaying
of Donna Sue Davis in Sioux City, Ia." Lincoln (Nebr.) Star, July 2, 1955, p. 16,

col. 1.
66. TmzDemAx, LimiTATioNs op PoLict Powim 117 (1886).
67. The earliest reference was to vagabonds as "idle, and suspected persons." 11

Hen. 7, c. 2 (1494).
68. 1 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1547).
69. In the Matter of Forbes, 11 Abb. Pr. 52, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860); see Com-

monwealth v. Roth, 136 Pa. Super. 301, 304, 7 A.2d 145, 146 (1939). "The . . . idea
that 'where there is smoke there must be fire' is the reason why vagrancy has been a
crime for centuries." Note, 80 U. PA. L. Rzv. 565, 568 (1932).
70. State v. Harlow, 174 Wash. 227, 233, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933).
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"productive of innumerable vices and crimes of great magnitude." "
Thus, the arrests are supposed to "check evil in its beginning" 72 and
"prevent crime by disrupting and scattering the breeding spot." "
This theory that purposeful poverty will lead to other criminality
has a certain basis in common sense, for if a man is idle with no means
of support, "there is a great temptation to steal in order to relieve his
hunger." "' But that statement suggests the rationale's limitations,
for if the necessity of self-support is what turns the vagrant to crime,
that criminality may be of a very petty nature. 5 The most common
example is undoubtedly begging which, although usually proscribed
by statute or ordinance,76 still retains strong public tolerance carried
over from religious teaching on giving and the tradition of holy men
living upon alms." The sanction against begging has not repressed
the practice7" and is not vigorously enforced, with the result that there
are sufficient funds to be coaxed out of the public to meet the demands
of those who seek merely a meal, a bed or another drink. A man
with such limited objectives is not forced into very serious criminality
to obtain gratification.
Nor does it necessarily follow that one who is idle and apparently
without means of support will turn to criminality. When completely
down and out, he may be able to go on relief or to obtain help from
friends or relatives. Many casual workers obtain jobs between periods
of unemployment-which last as long as any funds remain-after
which they may ship out to sea, go back to migratory agricultural
labor or seasonal industrial work or even get a job right in the skid
71.
72.
1933).
73.
74.
75.

County of Northampton v. West, 28 Pa. 173, 175 (1857).
Levine v. State, 110 N.J.L. 467, 470, 166 Atl. 300, 302 (Hudson County C.P.

People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 323, 199 N.E. 495, 498 (1936).
Daniel v. State, 110 Ga. 915, 916, 36 S.E. 293 (1900).
See notes 80-83 infra.
76. E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 281 (1935) ; VT. Rxv. STAT. § 8444 (1947). In
Philadelphia several magistrates informed me that begging is punished as straight
vagrancy, although no such cases were observed. Compare the tramp statute, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4617 (Purdon 1945), which covers begging but which is a misdemeanor.
77. ". .

.

[T]here grew up in the course of time the theory of the religious merit of

almsgiving. Charity became a means of securing forgiveness of sin to the giver, a
means of grace. Almsgiving, no longer the means primarily of helping a fellow-man
in need, became fundamentally a method of washing away one's sins.
"With the rise of monasticism in Christendom the religious basis of begging in
the cleansing grace of charity was completed in the theory that those were of superior
sanctity who forsook all their worldly possessions and depended entirely upon the
charity of God's people. Thus, the religious basis of beggary had its roots deep in
man's desire to free himself from sin by giving to a beggar, and on the other hand got
its justification from the desire to attain salvation by becoming a beggar. From both
points of view religion sanctified begging." Gillin, Vagrancy and Begging, 35 AM. J.
Soc. 425, 426 (1929).
78. "Excepting prohibition, there is probably no problem in which attempts at
control appear to have been a more blatant and universal failure than they have in the
case of begging." GILMOR, Txri BFAo 213 (1940).
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row. A man willing to undergo the very low standard of living of
the stereotype vagrant may, like Thoreau in Walden, work at odd
jobs only to the extent necessary to provide for his limited needs. Men
whose stories would place them in each of these categories were interviewed at the House of Correction, and they find occasional recognition in the reported cases. 9
No adequate studies have been found to correlate the incidence
of other criminality among vagrants and thus test the validity of
this breeding-ground theory. Probably no such study could be made,
for police practices have little relationship to this judicially-created
rationale. Even if it could be determined that persons arrested for
vagrancy also had a high-incidence of other criminality, little light would
be thrown on the breeding ground theory, for the police make many arrests for vagrancy without regard to whether or not the arrested person
falls into the status of a vagrant.
Such material as is available, however, lends weight to the belief
that there is little correlation between pauperism and serious criminality. A study of the prior convictions of a sample of inmates admitted to the Philadelphia House of Correction reveals fairly high
recidivism confined to other vagrancy and habitual drunkenness convictions but a low- rate of iecidivism for other more serious crimes. 0
Even writers who support the "breeding ground" rationale also state
that it does not breed dangerous criminality. 8 The British Vagrancy
Committee's exhaustive study in 1906 reported that "the witnesses who
have given evidence before us agree that the vagrant class as a whole
is not much addicted to the worse forms of crime, but minor offenses
are very common," citing petty larcenies from the back doors of houses
79. Leonard v. State, 5 Ga. App. 494, 63 S.E. 530 (1909) (defendant who usually
loafed not a vagrant when earning enough to live in meager style) ; Lewis v. State, 3
Ga. App. 322, 59 S.E. 933 (1907); Senegal v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 408, 16 S.W.2d
1070 (1929) (idling around pool halls by longshoremen with only occasional employment held not vagrancy).
80. See Hiller & Rector, INTAKE AND RE.EAsa PRocE:$us IN TME HousE OF
CoRREcroN, PHILADELPHIA, PA. (Nat'l Probation & Parole Ass'n 1953) (mimeo).
For the recidivism of all 164 inmates studied, see id. table I at 94; of 134 males, see
id. table K at 96-97. Of the cases studied, 61 were defendants serving vagrancy or
habitual drunkenness sentences, of whom 24 appeared to be first commitments, 29 had
prior commitments for vagrancy or habitual drunkenness, and only 8 had other criminal
records, of which several appeared to be for minor criminality only.
81. For an example of this confusion compare the following excerpts from DAWSON, THx VAGRANCY PROaLXM (1910):

"Dislike of regular labor makes them tramps, tramping makes them criminalsthe two conditions are inseparably connected as cause and effect, for their kinship lies
in the very constitution and instincts of human nature.... " Id. at 37.
"It is not-in the main, at any rate-a dangerous criminal class with which we
have to do, but for the most part the weak and aimless characters whose great need is
the moral tonic of discipline and compulsion." Id. at 72.
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as an example. 2 Kinberg's study of vagrants in Sweden found a large
group of tramps, hobos, vagabonds and intermittent vagrants characterized by an absence of criminality in the usual sense, and he cites
other European studies showing many subjects punished innumerable
times for vagrancy but with no manifestations of other forms of criminality.' This Philadelphia study appears to support these conclusions,
for there was no indication by police and magistrates that they regarded
the vagrants as dangerous potential criminals. Many, indeed, when in
the grip of acute alcoholism, were more an object of pathos than
anything else.
In any event this analysis is rendered somewhat academic because
the police take a much more pragmatic view of suspicion as a policy
behind vagrancy law. The arrests, both in Philadelphia and in other
jurisdictions as revealed in reported cases, give little indication that
the police are consciously suppressing a mode of life because it may
lead to future criminality. Where suspicion of any sort is involved,
it is suspicion of past criminality. In Philadelphia, magistrates would
sometimes commit with some such explanation as "I'm going to have
you investigated; there have been a lot of robberies around here."
On a number of occasions one magistrate delivered a "You people may
think I'm cruel" speech to the spectators at his hearings, one version
of which would continue: "It may seem cruel to send all these people
up like this, but you'd be surprised how many are wanted in other
jurisdictions. Last month alone 50 of these men were wanted." (The
month referred to was June, 1951; according to information supplied
the writer at the House of Correction, only one of the commitments for
that month was wanted in another jurisdiction.) This is a crude, freeswinging method of trying to solve past crimes, not an attack on a
breeding place of potential criminals.
Cases in other jurisdictions indicate that, where suspicious circumstances cause an arrest for vagrancy, something more specific than
status is involved. 4 The charge may be a mere cloak for an arrest
that officers have been ordered to make, 5 an arrest for some other
offense, as a means of validating what would otherwise be an illegal
82. DEPARTMENTAL COMMITT
ON VAGRANCY, REPORT 25 (London 1906). For
an optimistic recent British report on the rehabilitative possibilities of tramps and
vagrants, see editorial comment, 112 JusT. P. 727 (1948).

83. Kinberg, On So-Called Vagrancy; a Medico-Sociological Study, 24 J. CRIAr.

L., C. & P.S. 409, 552 (1933).

84. See generally Note, Use of Vagrancy-type Laws for the Arrest and Detentioz
of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALt L.J. 1351 (1950).

85. People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 47, 91 Pac. 997, 1000 (1907).
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search... The defendant may be a suspected p- stitute 7 or pickpocket, 8 an associate of bootleggers" or suspected of participation in
the narcotics traffic." He may be acting suspiciously near a saloon "'
or in a car 92 or by peering into store windows, 3 where the facts observed do not amount to an attempt. The charge has been used to
support arrests for activities which the police desire to suppress, such
as "communistic agitation," "' or labor organizationY The San Francisco police once arrested 375 men at one time, mostly in union halls,
and charged them with vagrancy. 96
A traditional vagrancy statute such as Pennsylvania's is ill-adapted
to such police practices. Such elements as idleness and being without
visible means of support describe a status and are aimed at a mode of
life, not at isolated instances of idleness.91 If the statutes were correctly
construed and applied, such status elements would seriously interfere
with what is now one of vagrancy's most convenient aspects from a
police standpoint-the authority to arrest without a warrant on view
of the offense.98 Observation of an isolated instance of idleness would
not justify an arrest; an officer would have to wait until he had
observed "a series of acts extending over a considerable period of
time, and only constituting a criminal offense because of their continuance and repetition .

.

.

."

"

86. Gray v. State, 243 Wis. 57, 9 N.W.2d 68 (1943).
87. Beal v. District of Columbia, 82 A.2d 765 (D.C. Munic. App. 1951), rev'd,
201 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
88. Burns v. District of Columbia, 34 A.2d 714 (D.C. Munic. App. 1943).
89. Campbell v. State, 31 Okla. Crim. 39, 237 Pac. 133 (1925) ; Hutchins v. State,
172 Tenn. 108, 110 S.W.2d 319 (1937).
90. Blakeley v. State, 78 Ga. App. 516, 51 S.E2d 598 (1949).
91. State v. Carrol, 129 N.J.L. 416, 30 A.2d 54 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 130
N.J.L. 559, 33 A.2d 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
92. People v. Johnaken, 196 Misc. 1059, 94 N.Y.S.2d 102 (New Rochelle City Ct.
1950).
93. McNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 237, 195 At]. 725 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
94. In the Matter of Cutler, 1 Cal. App. 2d 273, 36 P.2d 441 (1934) ; see Ames,
A Reply to "Who Is a Vagrant in California?",23 CALIF. L. REv. 616, 618 (1935).
95. See Note, 59 YA.t L.J. 1351, 1357 n.20 (1950), citing a report on interference
with labor and civil liberties in Hudson County, N.J.
96. People v. Jackson (Super. Ct. San Francisco 1935) (unreported); see Comment, Who Is a Vagrant in California., 23 CALIF. L. REV. 507 nn.2 & 3 (1935).
97. Brooks v. State, 33 Ala. App. 390, 34 So. 2d 175 (1948). There is little authority on how much of a continuendo is required to establish a vagrant mode of life.
Compare Branch v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 471, 165 S.W. 605 (1914) (conviction affirmed
where police had watched defendant loaf and dance jigs for 13 days), with Blakeley
v. State, 78 Ga. App. 516, 51 S.E.2d 598 (1949) (conviction reversed where police
watched defendant loaf for 11 days).
98. This authority is generally assumed and is frequently explicitly provided by
statute. E.g., N.J. REV. STAT. §2A:169-3 (1951); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 137, §37
(1954) (may arrest "upon view of" the offense) ; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2033
(Purdon 1945). Where the power to arrest on sight is not statutory, it has been implied. People v. Formiscio, 39 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1943).
99. People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 46, 91 Pac. 997, 999 (1907).
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No cases were observed in this study in which the police gave
any indication of trying to get evidence on a defendant's mode of life
and making an arrest only after they had observed a sufficient series
of acts to add up to the prohibited status. Vagrancy is of use to the
police in Philadelphia today as a weapon against suspicious persons
only because the law is so loosely and illegally administered that an
isolated act is all that is required for conviction. The magistrates were
apparently unaware of the proof necessary to establish the status elements which are essential ingredients of the offense; in any event, they
never applied them.
This emphasizes the absurdity of utilizing traditional vagrancy
as a means of controlling persons suspected of serious criminality.
Pauperism and vagrant status are not important indicia of the evils
the police are primarily concerned with suppressing. Professional
criminals are likely to have "visible means of support," and the attempt to prove they are vagrants runs into the difficulty described by
a Chicago municipal court judge in discussing a vagrancy prosecution:
"In the Winkler case, if there ever was a case where there
should have been a conviction, that was the case. They introduced
machine guns and everything else, but the jury took the position,
as they told one of the bailiffs afterwards, that a man who is a vagrant has no visible means of support, and how could he be a
vagrant if he lives on Sheridan Road ?" "'

A number of jurisdictions have tried to deal with this problem by
enacting statutes whose elements are believed to be more reliable
indicators of professional criminality. Such statutes have had constitutional difficulties as they have strayed from the traditional patterns whose common-law vintage makes them acceptable to the
courts. 10 1 One type of statute makes the key element the consorting of persons who have criminal reputations.'
So far these
have been upheld by the courts, 3 although they raise serious policy
and constitutional problems. When compared with traditional vagrancy they have the advantage of making the elements of the offense
reflect more reasonable grounds of suspicion under modern conditions
than is provided by the status of poverty.
100. Testimony of Judge Thomas A. Green of Chicago Municipal Court, in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d

Sess. 305, 308-09 (1934).
101. For decisions invalidating such statutes, see, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451 (1939) ; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934) ; People v.
Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643, 250 N.W. 520 (1934) ; St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582 (1873).
102. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A :170-1 (1951); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 722(11). Illegal
intent is also an element of such statutes, but typically this is unimportant because
proof of the key elements is prima facie evidence of the required intent.
103. E.g., People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 199 N.E. 495 (1936).
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3. Catch-all of the Criminal Law
The third major policy objective which is served by vagrancy
law administration in Philadelphia has been almost completely ignored
by courts and writers. When a magistrate talked about "cleaning up
his district," he was referring to the role of vagrancy-type enforcement
as the garbage pail of the criminal law. Prosecutions were carried on
in a bewildering variety of other situations which had no relation to
the suppression of criminality. These included cleaning "loafers"
out of the city center, "mopping up" the drunkards in the skid row,
punishing attempted suicides, obliging persons who desired to send
unwanted aged relatives to the House of Correction on cooked-up vagrancy charges, convicting mentally ill persons of vagrancy and likewise
confining them behind the House of Correction's bars, punishing minor
nuisances which do not amount to any crime and vindicating affronts
to police dignity. The common ground which brings such a motley
assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-type
proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits "conviction" for
almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate solution.
Dressing up the City Center
These efforts were usually supported by editorials urging that:
it is about time that these breathing spaces in the heart of
the city be taken away from the idlers and the parolees and given
back safely to the people." 104
During an earlier "blitz" it was reported that:
"[the effectiveness of the drive] . .

.

prompted the Central

YMCA and other organizations yesterday to ask Captain Kronbar
to widen the 'no man's land' for vagrants and rout them from other
midcity loitering places." 105
At such times the tempo of activity in magistrates' courts increased, but unpublicized "clean-up" activity goes on continuously.
None of the usual motivations of vagrancy apply to such action. There
was apparently no suspicion of other criminality involved, and there
was no attempt to force people to work. The only reason for the
arrests was that the appearance of the victims was not attractive.
104. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 13, 1954, p. 12, col. 2.
105. Id., June 27, 1949, p. 1, col. 8.
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Usually the evidence fell far short of that necessary to sustain vagrancy or habitual drunkenness, the offense in most instances being, as
the newspapers report, no more than "idling and loitering." Pennsylvania has no statute outlawing loitering; indeed, most statutes which
have sought to proscribe mere loitering have been held unconstitutional.1' 6
Cleaning Up the Skid Row
The principal problem is drunkenness, but loitering is also involved.
One magistrate described the clean-up process:
"About midnight on Saturday night the patrol wagons roll
out with a group of officers on each. No call has come in for them;
they know what they want. When they come to a certain block
they stop, two officers go up one sidewalk and two on the other,
and literally scoop them up."
A feature of these clean-ups are the "protective arrests" which
occur when the officers find
"a better-dressed man, perhaps with a nice watch. He doesn't
belong there. The police know only one thing can happen, so they
pick him up, too, to protect him, charge him with vagrancy, and
then the next morning the magistrate releases him, or after a few
hours the house sergeant releases him on a Form 80.107

This

helps the police, by saving them from having to look for the man
who would have robbed him, and it helps the man by keeping
him from being robbed."
This process goes on continuously. The drunk cell in a skid
row police station is no sooner emptied by one morning's hearings than
new arrests start coming in, grist for the following day's mill. Anyone familiar with skid row conditions will approach the problem of
the police with understanding. One officer stated, "You find the same
guy lying around night after night. Finally you get fed up, tip the
magistrate off, and at least you know that you won't have to see his
face for the next three months." Thus frequently, when a drunkenness defendant would be called up, a police officer would interject,
"Judge, this man's in here all the time. He's a regular pest." The
106. Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931) ; Commonwealth
v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950) ; St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502,
109 S.W. 30 (1908). But see State v. Jasmin, 105 Vt. 531, 535, 168 At]. 545, 546 (1933).
107. See note 162 infra. Compare this practice with MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 272,

§ 46 (1933), § 45 (Supp. 1954) (§ 46 provides for release of drunks "upon recovery" on
condition that person so released waives any claim for damages which he might otherwise have had against arresting officer).
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magistrate would then impose sentence, and several times stressed to the
writer the importance of such "cooperation" with the police. Many
of these defendants were doubtless chronic alcoholics, and some may
have been known as such to the magistrates on basis of personal observation, but in not one of the hearings observed was there competent
evidence to sustain the charge of habitual drunkenness.""8 The seriousness of alcoholism as a national problem and the complicated medical
and emotional disorders which it presents dramatize the fact that
radical changes are needed in procedures for handling the indigent alcoholic. The magistrates are completely unequipped to deal with the
problem.'9
Conviction of the Mentally or Physically Ill
The use of a vagrancy conviction as a means of institutionalizing
mentally ill persons was admitted to be illegal by magistrates interviewed but was defended as a necessary humanitarian service. The
commitment of the physically ill is" probably not intentional but is
another by-product of procedural laxity. This abuse of the criminal
process is best illustrated by abstracts from the medical records at the
House of Correction:
A. G., vagrancy, 1/31/51. Had to be carried from the van
by other prisoners, immediately transferred to Philadelphia General Hospital, where he died within 24 hours. The Medical Officer at Correction protested to the committing magistrate, who
claimed that the defendant stood before him; the Medical Officer
stated this would have been impossible.
H. Y., vagrancy, 2/5/51. Arrested at 4 P. M., he was
taken to a hospital, treated for malnutrition, returned to the police
station and committed the next morning. He arrived on a
stretcher.
F. S., vagrancy, 2/14/5 1. The defendant was taken to Philadelphia General Hospital by police. At 5:30 A. M. the hospital
called police asking them to take him back. He was placed under
arrest at 6:10 A. M. for being at the hospital "contrary to law" and
was committed that morning. Arriving on a stretcher in serious
108. See note 11 supra. See Able v. State, 62 So. 2d 239 (Ala. App. 1953), reversing a conviction as a common drunkard where there was evidence of only six instances
of drunkenness in a year, and imposing as a test that sobriety must be the exception;
compare the following definition from the Pennsylvania Mental Health Act, PA. STrAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 1072 (Purdon Supp. 1954) : "(7) 'Inebriate' shall mean a person who
is so habitually addicted to the use of alcoholic or other intoxicating or narcotic substances as to be unable or unwilling to stop the excessive use of such substances without help. The term shall include ... 'habitual drunkard.'"
109. For alternative provisions for dealing with alcoholics, see the Mental Health
Act, id. § 1161 (a) (3) (provision for voluntary admission of inebriate to mental institution) ; id. § 1201(a) (6) (petition for court commitment). As the institution to which
the patient is sent must approve, id. § 1203 (e), and as institutional facilities are severely
limited, the availability of this treatment is limited.
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condition, he was immediately transferred 10 miles back to Philadelphia General Hospital.
J. M., habit, drunk., 4/24/51. Arrived on a stretcher in
restraints, answered all questions with whistles, previous mental
hospital history.
T. S., vagrancy, 4/26/51. On arrival at House of Correction, immediately transferred to Philadelphia General Hospital, diagnosis possible skull fracture.
H. B., habit. drunk., 5/26/51. Arrived in restraints.
A. K., habit. drunk., 5/28/51. Arrested at 9:30 P. M., at
2:30 A. M. taken to Philadelphia General Hospital, diagnosis
alcoholism with suicidal intent. As no bed available, returned to
station house, committed, arrived on stretcher.
S. G., vagrancy, 5/29/51. After trying to commit suicide in
Reading Terminal, defendant taken by police to hospital, injury
dressed, returned to station house and committed next morning.
Immediately transferred to Philadelphia General Hospital because
of loss of blood, suicidal tendencies.
F. M., habit. drunk., 6/28/51. Arrived on stretcher, semistuporous, died 7/1 in Philadelphia General Hospital.
Y. H., habit, drunk., 7/10/51. Arrived in restraints, suicide
threats.
P. W., vagrancy, 7/15/51. Arrived on stretcher, immediately
transferred to Philadelphia General Hospital in serious condition.
In answer to protests, the magistrate admitted that the defendant,
a Philadelphia resident, was in bad physical condition when before
him, but stated that defendant's son was prosecutor and requested
the commitment.
Similar cases were reported the following year during a study of
the House of Correction by the National Probation and Parole Association, which observed that "it. is unfortunate that so many psychotic or feebleminded inmates are held in the House of Correction for
long periods." 110 These cases indicated attempts by the magistrates
to find satisfactory solutions of problems for which they had neither
the facilities nor the training to handle. The excuse that it was necessary to use a prison for cases of this kind because of the unavailability
of other facilities may or may not have been valid."' Even if it was,
110. HILLER & RECTOR, INTAKE AND RELEASE PRocEtDUEs IN THE HousE or CORRECTION, PHILADELPHIA, PA. 11 (Nat'l Probation & Parole Ass'n 1953) (mimeo).

111. Compare the experience of Allegheny County, where the same necessity argument was advanced. When the County Board of Prison Inspectors ruled in October,
1953, that mental patients would no longer be accepted in jail, a temporary solution for
the supposedly insoluble problem was found within two months. See JANAVITZ & BOZE-

MAN,

ALLEGHENY

COUNTY

TACKLES

A MENTAL

HEALTH

PROBLEM,

CURRENTS

IN

PENNSYLVANIA'S HEALTH & WELFARE 14, 16 (Pa. Citizen's Ass'n for Health & Welfare, Summer 1954).
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it does not mitigate the fact that there was no justification for allowing
a magistrate, untrained in medicine or law, to determine who should
be committed in a summary, vagrancy-type criminal proceeding.
Jail for the Aged
An official at the House of Correction reported a case which
typifies this problem. A private agency had been supporting a sixtyfour year old alien who was ineligible for relief but wished to get him
into the Home for the Indigent until he was eligible for old age assistance. One of the agency's social workers was told by a magistrate
that this could be done if she would bring her client before him. When
this was done, he was immediately convicted as a vagrant and sentenced
to three months. This brought him within, a stone's throw of his intended destination, as the House of Correction adjoins the Home for
the Indigent on the same grounds; but the social worker was upset
even though the magistrate assured her this was "the normal procedure." When the defendant found himself in a gloomy cell behind
bars he became very agitated. A director's release and transfer to the
Home for the Indigent were arranged. This is typical of the administrative rather than judicial correction of the more flagrant abuses.
However, it leaves the defendant with a criminal record as a vagrant,
which might have particularly serious consequences for an alien.
Other cases were observed in which daughters or wives of elderly
men accused as habitual drunkards appeared to request commitment.
The magistrates almost invariably complied and left the question of
conviction up to the complainant. In some of these cases it appeared
that this was the first time the defendant had ever appeared in court.
Here again there may have been evidence which would have justified
institutionalization in a home for the aged, but such evidence was not
before the magistrates when they made their decisions. The result was
a summary decision, based on one party's evidence without any social
case work investigation of the circumstances, and a 'criminal conviction
and prison confinement for a "crime" that at most was senility."1
Occasionally aged persons were picked up, convicted as vagrants
and sent to the House of Correction where, for the first time, it was
discovered that they had homes and that their relatives were engaged in a frantic search for them."'
112. For similar cases, see Hn-LgR & RPCrOR, op. cit. supra note 110, cases number
2, 7, 9, 31 and 44.
113. Id. case number 14, in which a resident of Atlantic City who owned his own
home and had a $2,000 savings bank account was taken from a hospital to a magistrate
who committed him as a vagrant at a time when his family was searching for him.

636

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104

Self-Commitments
A few cases were observed in which a defendant walked into the
police station of his own accord and asked the magistrate to send him
up. Such defendants were committed as vagrants. One case at the
House of Correction was also observed. As the writer arrived in the
morning, the guards were trying to get rid of an inmate who had
just been discharged but who was sitting on the sidewalk just outside
the entrance. Three hours later he was still sitting, this time 100 yards
further down the sidewalk. Two mornings later he was observed arriving in the police van with a three month sentence as a vagrant.
A number of inmates appeared to be of this type, and some had as
many as seventy prior commitments to the House of Correction. They
were totally unable to take care of themselves, and as they advanced
in age, they were transferred to the Home for the Indigent.
Abating Nuisances
Disputes within the confines of the home between a landlady and
her boarder, between husband and wife or father and daughter, men
who refused to pay for meals in restaurants, a man arrested because
he entered a restaurant from which he had previously been ejected
with orders never to return-these are examples of "annoyance" cases
which illustrate the variety of magisterial practice. Usually this type
of defendant was charged with disorderly conduct, which carries a
maximum penalty of only a $10 fine, or imprisonment up to 30 days in
default of payment of the fine.11 4 Convictions were observed in all
the foregoing cases, although probably none of the convictions would
stand up on appeal. Such defendants were punished for nuisances
which the complainant, the police, the magistrate and probably many
of the public all agree should be punishable.
The most unusual instance of a vagrancy-type conviction being
used to abate a nuisance involved a defendant who was convicted as
an habitual drunkard, although he was not drunk when arrested and
claimed that he did not drink. According to an oral report given to
the House of Correction by the social worker of a private agency,
the real reason for his commitment was that he was "oversexed." He
allegedly requested intercourse with his wife three or four times a
night, and neighbors who had overheard his requests testified against
him. The social worker reported that he was committed for habitual
drunkenness because "the magistrate couldn't think of anything else.
114. PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4406 (Purdon 1945).
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What could he do? He had to send him away, he couldn't leave him
there with that poor girl."
Affronts to Police Dignity
A problem related to the administration of vagrancy-type laws
concerns arrests and prosecutions, usually for disorderly conduct but
occasionally for vagrancy, which arise from altercations between the
defendant and the police. Depending upon the character of the defendant, these cases may or may not fall within the scope of this study."'
Frequently disorderly conduct charges of this kind concerned "respectable" defendants;"" but in a number of instances alleged hostility
between a police officer and the defendant was the ground upon which
a vagrancy-type arrest was made.
Examples include a defendant described as a "tough guy" who
was involved in a run-in with a police captain in plain clothes. Another
was a defendant whom police testimony described as "known to be a
cop-fighter," who was sitting in a bar making uncomplimentary comments about the police in general. When a plainclothesman who was
present told him to stop, he became abusive and police used force to
overcome him. A defendant of Mexican ancestry was found guilty for
the use of abusive language to an officer who had ordered him to move
out of the bus terminal. The defendant moved only from one side of
the terminal to the other and talked back. As the defendant spoke
Spanish, the officer did not understand what he said, but he assumed
the words were abusive and made the arrest.
V.

PROBLEMS OF PROOF

In a recent case a Washington publisher found he had only 15
in his possession when his car stalled in Dover, Delaware. He went
to the police station to phone his relatives for money, but while he was
there his talk "just didn't ring right" to the police chief, "so we held
him overnight on a vagrancy charge." The magistrate who heard the
115. Many of the disorderly conduct cases observed are not reported in this study
because they are irrelevant to the general problems of vagrancy-type law, e.g., street
fights, disturbances in taprooms, boisterous activity in public places. We are concerned
with disorderly conduct, however, where it is applied as a vehicle for prosecuting vagrancy-type defendants or to punish by analogy conduct which is not specifically proscribed by statute but is objectionable to police or magistrates.
116. E.g., a case in which a defendant charged with disorderly conduct tore up a
parking ticket in front of the officer who had just handed it to him and allegedly cursed
the officer. Compare Taylor v. Olschafsky, 35 Delaware County Rep. 393, 395 (Delaware County, Pa., C.P. 1947) (upholding damages for false arrest where, in argument
over traffic ticket, the officer "lost his head and, in a police officer, this is not good"),
with Commonwealth v. Savko, 34 Erie County Rep. 77 (Erie County, Pa., Q.S. 1951)
(upholding conviction of disorderly conduct on similar facts).
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case next day said that the defendant "rambled" and "if he hadn't been
so belligerent .

.

. he could have been released right away."

So

the defendant spent another twenty-four hours in jail until his relatives
persuaded the magistrate that the defendant was in fact the respectable
citizen he claimed to be. The magistrate explained, "We didn't want
to let the man loose in society without being very sure of his background." 117
This case epitomizes the manner in which the burden of proof
was allocated in Philadelphia practice observed in this study. As a
practical matter in many of the cases, the defendant is prima facie
guilty, and the burden is placed upon him to give a satisfactory answer
to the question, "What have you got to say for yourself?" Despite
the "overriding presumption of innocence," "I' vagrancy statutes are
so drafted that to a limited extent this magisterial practice can be justified under the law.
On its face the Pennsylvania vagrancy statute requires that five
facts must be found before a valid conviction can be returned.119 The
defendant must
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

have come from outside the state, and
be found loitering or residing therein, and
follow no labor, trade, occupation or business, and
have no visible means of subsistence, and
be unable to give a reasonable account of himself or his business in the place where he is found.

The first two requirements raise no unusual procedural problems.
On its face the third element would appear to be part of the proof which
the prosecution must supply, but although the cases are often strangely
silent on the point, the indication is that this element creates an implied
burden on the defendant to prove that he has employment or has made
efforts to obtain it. The fourth element also creates an implied presumption which must be rebutted by the defendant. Although the
statute purports to say that, in combination with the other elements,
lack of visible means of support is punishable,' ° this construction would
lead to ridiculous results where the defendant, although apparently
without means of support, in fact could prove that he had sufficient re117. Wilmington (Del.) Morning News, June 21, 1955, p. 1, col. 3.
118. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).
119. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 2032 (IV) (Purdon 1945).

120. An argument that the statute should be given this literal interpretation will
be found in Gentry v. Town of Booneville, 199 Miss. 1, 5, 24 So. 2d 88, 89-90 (1945)
(concurring opinion of Smith, C..).
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sources. It is clear from the cases that proof of no visible means of
subsistence merely creates a prima facie case which the defendant can
The fifth element
rebut by showing actual lawful means of support.'
clearly places a burden on the defendant; once guilty appearances have
been shown, he must rebut the prima facie case by giving a "reasonable
account of himself." Thus once it has been shown that a person who
has come from without the state has been found loitering, some burden
must be assumed by the defendant if he is to show his innocence.
As there are no relevant Pennsylvania cases, an analysis of the
nature of these burdens requires examination of analogous provisions
in other jurisdictions. A few vagrancy statutes provide for the allocation of the burden of persuasion, such as a provision that proof of
idleness and other appearances of guilt ". . . shall constitute a prima
122 or mean
facie presumption that such person is a vagrant, .
that ". . . the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant to show

that he has sufficient property from which to obtain a support, or sufficient means of maintaining a fair, honest, and reputable livelihood.
)) 123
A showing of idleness may place upon the defendant the
burden ".

.

ployment, .

. to show reasonable efforts in good faith to secure em.124

and the legislative history of the District of Co-

lumbia vagrancy statute shows the congressional intent ".

.

.

that

the burden shall be upon the defendant arrested under this legislation
to show that he has a lawful employment or has lawful means of support
realized from a lawful occupation or source." "" Without such legislative aid the courts have reached the same result, that ".

.

. the

State has made out its case when these appearances of guilty violation
are proven." 126
A few courts have held that the "prima facie case" made out by
such a showing of guilty appearances bursts in the face of uncontradicted rebuttal testimony, and that unless the state then proceeds with
additional evidence, a conviction will be reversed.127 But in most jurisdictions the burden upon the defendant is the burden of persuasion; 128
121. See note 120 supra, and notes 126, 127 infra.
122. S.D. CODE § 13.1424 (1939).
123. ALA. CODr ANN. tit. 14, § 439 (1940).
124. IOWA CoD- § 746.2 (1950) ; see also VA. CoDE ANN. § 63-339 (1950).
125. H.R. Rnp. No. 1248, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
126. Hutchins v. State, 172 Tenn. 108, 112, 110 S.W.2d 319, 321 (1937).
127. Blakeley v. State, 78 Ga. App. 516, 51 S.E.2d 598 (1949) ; State v. Oldham,
224 N.C. 415, 30 S.E.2d 318 (1944) ; cf., State v. Hagen, 130 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Mo.
App. 1939); People v. Sohn, 269 N.Y. 330, 335, 199 N.E. 501, 503 (1936).
128. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 16 Ala. App. 85, 75 So. 633 (1917) ; Burns v. District of Columbia, 34 A.2d 714 (D.C. Miunic. App. 1943) ; State v. Hall, 25 N.J. Misc.
381 (Essex County Ct. Spec. Sess. 1947); City of Greenville v. Ward, 94 S.C. 321,

77 S.E. 1021 (1913).
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thus the jury ". . . will not be bound to accept in satisfaction the unsupported statement of the accused although no witness is produced
who is able to testify directly to the contrary-this because to hold
otherwise would, in many cases, put it in the power of the accused,
by his own unsupported assertions, to nullify the statute, and render
it of no use." 129

The defendant's income, if not apparent, is

"

peculiarly within his knowledge and power to bring forward and establish.

.

. . If he had an employer he might have produced him,

or fellow employees; if he had a bank account he might have produced
his banker." 130 On this theory a District of Columbia pickpocketvagrancy conviction was sustained although the defendant gave a plaus3 1
ible and unrebutted explanation of the $65 found on his person.
The burden of rebuttal which the courts have thus placed upon
the defendant is magnified by the vagueness of the statutory elements.
If the defendant wishes to show that he has "visible means of support"
and thereby challenge the basic fact on which rests the presumption of
no actual means of support, he will find no guidance in Pennsylvania
and little in other jurisdictions. Some courts state, without elaboration,
that this is "a term well understood" and with "a definite and fixed
meaning.""' Others have stated that, although "difficult of precise
definition or measurement," 133 its "long usage" has "fixed" its significance and directed it against the man ". . . who hangs about
streets and public places without . . . visible means of support.

,,' Under the parent British law a penny in the pocket may be
sufficient; " thus when a woman arrested for vagrancy was found on
examination to possess 9 shillings 6 pence, the magistrate ".

.

. had

no option but to discharge her." 136 In this country the few decisions
range from those following the British rule to cases excluding as irrelevant evidence the fact that the defendant had money on his person
at the time of arrest.117 It is unknown what the law is on this point in
Pennsylvania; "~in the few cases which were observed where the police
129. Gentry v. Town of Boonville, 199 Miss. 1, 5, 24 So. 2d 88, 89 (1945).
130. Hutchins v. State, 172 Tenn. 108, 111, 110 S.W.2d 319, 321 (1937).
131. Burns v. District of Columbia, 34 A.2d 714 (D.C. Munic. App. 1943).
132. Ex parte Taft, 284 Mo. 531, 544, 225 S.W. 457, 461 (1920).
133. People v. Johnaken, 196 Misc. 1059, 1061, 94 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1950).
134. People v. Sohn, 269 N.Y. 330, 334-35, 199 N.E. 501, 502 (1936).
135. DXPARTEMNTAL COMMIn S ON VAGRANCY, REPORTr (London 1906).
136. See 95 JusT. P. 267 (1931).
137. Branch v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 471, 165 S.W. 605 (1914). Money in the
pocket may be regarded as no proof because of the "danger" that vagrants will carry
money as a subterfuge to avoid arrest. People v. Cramer, 139 Misc. 545, 547, 247 N.Y.
Supp. 821, 824 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1930).
138. Similarly if the defendant wishes to rebut the presumed fact by showing that
he has actual means of support, there is no case authority to guide the courts in deter-

1956]

VAGRANCY-TYPE LAW

records showed that the defendant had a considerable sum of money on
his person when arrested, the problem was resolved by convicting the defendant so rapidly that he had no chance to raise the defense.
The Pennsylvania statute makes one element of the crime the fact
that the accused has no employment. Suppose he is physically unfit or
is unemployed and cannot find a job? It has been suggested that
.

he may be convicted and imprisoned, whether such condition

is his misfortune or his fault." ' Such an interpretation of the statute
would unquestionably be rejected today, and it would be a good defense
if the defendant could show "good faith" or "due diligence" or "reasonable effort" to obtain employment.14 We have already seen that
the defendant's unsupported testimony may not be credited by the trier
of fact and thus may not be sufficient to rebut the prima facie evidence.
Must he produce copies of his employment applications or bring into
court to testify on his behalf the men who have refused to employ him?
An early English statute made it a violation if a man refused an offer
to work "for meate and drynke" alone if nothing better could be obtained. 4' American statutes imply that if the basic fact of idleness is
to be rebutted, a defendant must not refuse any offer of work, no mat1 42
ter what the wages, working conditions or choice of employment.
The vagueness of the statutory elements and the difficulties of
making the rebuttals which the courts have required raise serious constitutional problems which are beyond the scope of this Article. 43 At
mining what amount of money is required. One court has required that a defendant
have enough "to support himself reasonably." People v. Cramer, supra note 137, at
825. To the obvious questions, "for how long, and by what standard of living?" there
is no answer.
139. In the Matter of Forbes, 11 Abb. Prac. 52, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860).
140. Cf. Ex parte Taft, 284 Mo. 531, 545, 225 S.W. 457, 461 (1920), where the
ordinance in question required one charged with vagrancy to show "reasonable effort
and in good faith" to secure work to rebut a prima facie case. The court held that this
was too vague because "each trial tribunal would be making its own ordinance" as to
what "amounted to 'reasonable effort."'
141. 1 EDw. 6, c. 3 (1547).
142. The only exceptions found are KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2409 (1949)
(violation to refuse to work only "when work at fair wages is to be procured in the
community"), and VA. CODE ANN. § 63-338(2) (1949) (punishes only those who "refuse to work for the usual and common wages given to other laborers in like work in
the place where they then are").
143. In Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910), the only
requirement was that there be "some" rational connection between the fact proved and
ultimate fact presumed. But Turnipseed was a civil case, and it is doubtful if that rule
is correct for criminal cases. It was not even applied in the peonage cases, Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), and Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942), and in other
cases where the Court purported to find an insufficient rational connection it appears
that other factors actually motivated the decisions, e.g., unfairness to the defendant in
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929), and Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
More useful is Justice Cardozo's examination of the basic fact to see if it carries "a
hint of criminality." "For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that the evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister significance." Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82, 90 (1934). This test was the one applied in that case and the peonage
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the practical level in Philadelphia, it is clear that most defendants could
not possibly meet such a burden of rebuttal. Although a statute applicable to Philadelphia requires that "all persons arrested shall be given
the opportunity to communicate promptly with, be interviewed or examined by, such persons as they desire . . .," 144 some defendants alleged that they were denied this right following their arrest, and such
denials may be common."4 Even if unrestricted access to the telephone were provided, it would be difficult for a man arrested during
the night to marshal the witnesses he needs to carry his burden of proof
and have them assembled ready to testify when court convenes at 9 a.m.
Frequently defendants were not permitted to make any rebuttal,
being cut off with some such remark as "nothing you say will help,"
or if rebuttal was permitted, the magistrate indicated that he had already prejudged the case, making remarks such as these:
"You're a bum. Well, what have you got to say for yourself ?"

"What do you do for a living? Steal a little here and a little
there ?"

In one case a defendant was charged with disorderly conduct. The
complaining witnesses were his ex-girl-friend and her sister, who alleged that he had annoyed them and created a disorderly scene in their
home. After an impassioned description of these activities, one of the
girls stated that this sort of thing could not go on much longer.
"Well, you won't have to worry about it for the next three
months," said the magistrate. He turned to the defendant for the
first time and said, in rapid-fire succession: "Well, what have you
got to say for yourself? Why did you do it? Three months in
the House of Correction."
On the evidence presented, this defendant probably had a valid defense to the charge of disorderly conduct for which he was ostensibly
on trial, i.e., that the disturbance alleged against him was not in public.
But as the sentence imposed upon him was greatly in excess of the
cases, and is implied in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928) (proof that defendant had possession of narcotics creates immediate suspicion of criminality and Oresumption therefore valid) ; Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (same as
to opium) ; and in the cases cited and distinguished in Tot v. United States, supra. By
this standard the presumptions implicit in a vagrancy prosecution would fall. "The mere
state of being without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race,
creed, or color." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (concurring opinion
of Jackson, J.). This reasoning would apply to the vagrancy presumptions with even
more force, for the basic fact which the state must prove is merely that the defendant
apparentlyhas no job and means of livelihood.
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1113 (Purdon Supp. 1954).
145. See also Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Boil in
Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. Rwv. 1031, 1054-55 (1954).
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maximum for disorderly conduct, it is apparent that he was convicted
of either habitual drunkeness or vagrancy, although there was no evidence relating to either charge.
VI. SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Like the substantive law, the practice of making vagrancy summarily triable before a magistrate originated early in the fifteenth century in the aftermath of the Black Death and feudalism.' 46 This procedure was carried over to the colonies, and, by mechanical application
of the rule that limited jury trial to cases for which it existed when the
constitution was adopted, it was held that vagrancy-type offenses were
summarily triable.1 4 7 Yet a magistrate in a vagrancy case can impose
up to one year's imprisonment for the first offense and two years for
certain repeaters. In no other category of criminality does Pennsylvania impose so severe a sanction without the right to trial by jury.
Some offenses classified as misdemeanors have a lesser sanction than
vagrancy,148 and all other Pennsylvania summary offenses provide for
imprisonment only in default of payment of a fine, and then only for
4
30 days or less.'

This denial of jury trial has been rationalized on the grounds that
it saves expense to the state and benefits the defendant by avoiding oppressive delay. 1 0 It is maintained that the defendant is not deprived of
any substantial rights, because the summary proceeding must still satisfy
due process requirements of a fair hearing.'"' Beyond this, because it
is in derogation of the right to jury trial, English writers have taken a
"strict view" of summary procedure," a view applied in Pennsylvania. 8 At its minimum the fair hearing required would include the
opportunity for the defendant to know and plead to the charge against
him, that the case against him be by competent evidence, that he have
146. 2 Hen. 5, c. 4 (1414).
147. Byers & Davis v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89 (1862).
148. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4511 (Purdon 1945) (keeping disorderly house),
id. § 4512 (prostitution), id. § 4519 (public indecency) and id. § 4524 (obscene literature) for offenses classified as misdemeanors with trial by jury but with a maximum
penalty of one year, less than vagrancy.
149. E.g., id. § 4406 (disorderly conduct, $10 or 30 days in default) ; id. § 4699.4

(worldly employment on Sunday, $4 or 6 days in default).
150. State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 605 (1880); 4 STEPHEN, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWs oV ENGLAND 265 (15th ed. 1908) (summary procedure is "designed for the
greater ease of the subject, by doing the offender speedy justice, and by not harassing
jurymen with frequent attendances to try every minute offence").

151. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937): "The hearing,
moreover, must be a real one, not a sham."
152. E.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280-81.
153. Commonwealth v. Borden, 61 Pa. 272 (1869).
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adequate opportunity to make a defense and that there be a record made
so that judicial review is possible." 4
The failure to meet these requirements in all observed cases would
suggest that, while undue delay may be oppressive, a procedure that
moves so rapidly that a defendant cannot prepare a defense is perhaps
even worse. The following conclusions about the way in which summary procedure was administered in the observed cases shows how
Philadelphia practice in vagrancy-type prosecutions deprived defendants of the most elementary requirements of a fair hearing.
(1) Defendants were rarely informed of the charge against them
until the "trial" was completed, and in only one or two instances were
they asked to plead guilty or not guilty.
(2) There was no pretense of proving the crime charged with
competent evidence and, with only one exception," there were no competent witnesses for the prosecution. Usually the only testimony was
the hearsay statement of a police officer not present at the arrest, who
reported to the magistrate what the police records said about the case.
Even this was dispensed with in many cases.
The proof in most cases consisted of the mere exhibition of a
"bum," with the result that there should have been an acquittal in almost every case. Thus there was no evidence of habitualness in any
habitual drunkenness prosecution observed, unless the magistrate's unsubstantiated memory and/or opinion or a policeman's unsworn comments be so considered; and in many vagrancy cases, despite undisputed
testimony that the defendants were Pennsylvania residents, convictions
were found under a statute that applies only to those who come from
"without this Commonwealth."
This suggests that perhaps the primary importance of the right to
a jury trial is that it militates, to some degree, against sham hearings.
(3) Defendants were uncounselled and unaided. While lawyers
appeared in a few disorderly conduct cases, in not one observed vagrancy or habitual drunkenness prosecution was the defendant represented by counsel. The Voluntary Defender was not present; and the
District Attorney plays no part in these prosecutions.
154. For other Pennsylvania citations see, BINNs, JUsTIcE 883-87 (12th ed. 1928).
Compare State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 150-51, 80 A.2d 617, 623 (1951), to the effect that
vagrancy-like crimes are "minor offenses denounced by statute below the grade of misdemeanors, and therefore punishable in a summary manner, yet quasi-criminal in essence and subject to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions."
155. In this case, a defendant was apparently charged with panhandling, and although his examination showed him to be within the broad magisterial definition of
vagrancy, the particular magistrate sitting that day discharged him because the prosecution witness failed to appear. This was the only vagrancy case observed in which
there was any reference to prosecution witnesses.
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(4) All other irregularities were accentuated by the speed of judicial process, referring both to the rapidity with which the "trials"
themselves are dispatched" 6 and the short interval between arrest and
final disposition. A man arrested during the night had usually been
tried, convicted and was en route to the House of Correction by eleven
in the morning. We have noted that this minimizes the opportunity
to retain a lawyer, contact friends or prepare a defense, even assuming
defendants are allowed to contact anyone.
(5) No records were kept which are available to magistrates at
time of trial to show prior convictions, although the frequency of intoxication arrests is obviously a relevant factor in a determination of
whether a defendant is an habitual drunkard. Further, the House of
Correction Act rigidly conditions the sentence which a magistrate can
lawfully impose upon the number of prior commitments, 15 7 but this requirement is ignored. At least one magistrate seemed to feel no need
for such records, on numerous occasions telling defendants: "All right,
don't let me see you here again. I never forget a face. I may not remember your name, but I never forget a face."
(6) In the overwhelming majority of cases, the magistrate's court
is also in practice the court of last resort. The careful provisions for
appeal, certiorari and habeas corpus,"" which on the statute books look
so fair, are almost a dead letter as far as these defendants are concerned. 59 Thus there is given ". . . to the magistrate in [vagrancy
law] . . . an almost unchecked opportunity for arbitrary oppression

or careless cruelty." 1' The few figures available in other jurisdictions
show a similar rarity of appeal.""
(7) Summary procedure suffers from the absence of the pretrial
procedure, which in felony or misdemeanor cases operates to weed out
156. See text at pp. 605-06 supra. One magistrate has described sitting over a weekend and disposing of 66 prisoners in 3 hours on Saturday and 100 in 4 hours on Sunday. Gilbert, Our Magistrate'sCourts, 6 THE SHINGL 68, 71 (1943).
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 681 (Purdon 1930).
158. For discussion of these three methods and the distinctions between them in
Philadelphia practice, see CRIzs SmvEY CoMM. orV THE LAW Ass'N op PHILADELPHIA, RZPORT 302-09 (1926). All of these methods of review require allowance by the
reviewing court, and there is no appeal as of right.
159. The magistrate who in 1951 was handling the largest number of vagrancy
cases informed the writer at that time that he could recall "only two appeals in the
last six years." At the same time, the clerk of the Philadelphia Quarter Sessions Court
could not recall a single vagrancy appeal.
160. In the Matter of Forbes, 11 Abb. Prac. 52, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860).
161. A few studies show less than 1% appeals. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1351, 1357
n.21 (1950). Appeal figures for New York City were found for two years, and showed
that for vagrancy other than prostitution in 1930 and 1931, there were 3,359 convictions
and 1 appeal. CITY MAoSTRAr'S CouRTs, Nzv YORK CITY, ANN. RE'. 20, 56 (1930);

id. at 38 (1931).
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defendants who are innocent or against whom there is insufficient evidence. Such defendants pass through numerous checks: preliminary
examination, indictment or information, and preparation of the case
leading, perhaps, to a nolle prosequi. All these involve correctives
for police errors or abuse, and many cases in practice are dropped at
these various levels. The only pretrial procedure in a vagrancy-type
case is that of the police house sergeant, who, in perhaps 10 per cent
of the drunk arrests, releases the defendant without any appearance
before a magistrate. 162 Thus the presumption of innocence has much
more probative validity in a magistrate's court because of the absence
of pretrial discretion, but, paradoxically, it is given much less weight
than in the Court of Quarter Sessions.
(8) The background and lack of legal training of most of the
magistrates is an important factor. As no other lawyers participate
in the proceedings, a magistrate who himself is probably untrained
in law must administer technically difficult vagrancy laws. This is
not the place to assess the magisterial system as a whole, or to review
the arguments for and against a lay judiciary." 3 The principal reason advanced for having "local community courts" presided over by a
lay judiciary is that this will prevent the development of "a legal formalism." '
Whether or not such informality is desirable in minor
civil controversies, 6 it is precisely the lack of any "legal formalism"
162. Under this procedure, when persons whom the police described as respectable
were arrested for drunkenness, they were permitted to telephone relatives to come get
them. Form 80 of the police department was executed, as follows: "I ..... do hereby
accept the responsibility of safely escorting to his home ...... who has been taken
into custody on ...... at ...... for his own protection because of intoxication. My
relation to him is ...... " In the 6th Police District in June, 1951, out of 850 drunkenness arrests, there were 81 discharges on Form 80. This practice is probably illegal.
See Note, 59 YALE L. J. 1351, 1359 n.28 (1950) ; Doherty v. Shea, 320 Mass. 173, 68
N.E.2d 707 (1946). But the form might be construed as a waiver of any claims for
damages for false imprisonment. Cf. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 272, §§ 45-46 (Supp. 1954).
163. Compare ERVIN, THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS or PHILADELPHIA 108-15 (1931)
(stressing the necessity of legal training for the discharge of magisterial duties), with
CoiMMIssION APPOINTED AT THE REcOM ENDATION OF THE SPECIAL GRAND JURY OF
To STUDY AND REcOMMEND IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LAWS RELATING TO MAGISSTRATES AND MAGISTRATES' COURTS IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, REPORT. The

1935

Commission supported the concept of "local community courts" and reiected proposals
which would have required that magistrates be members of the bar. The reasoning of
the Commission was directed wholly at civil suitors who "have no clear conception of

the legal aspects of their problems .... Their need is less for a determination of their

technical legal rights, than for a wise adjustment of their difficulties with their neighbors and others."
164. Ibid.
165. No study has ever been made examining magisterial practices in their civil
jurisdiction, and how the Commission, supra note 163, was able to reach the conclu-

sions it did in the absence of such evidence is not clear from its report. It would certainly seem to be no solution for the problem of untrained and unrepresented litigants
to provide that the judge shall be untrained as well. For a study revealing magisterial
inadequacy and abuse in another aspect of their jurisdiction-admission to bail, see
Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1036-46 (1954).

1956]

VAGRANCY-TYPE LAW

which is the primary cause of much of the abuse in vagrancy-type cases.
Informality is a dubious goal for proceedings whose outcome may be
a sentence of imprisonment of up to two years.
(9) As has been noted, the magistrate is crippled by the lack of
any of the treatment tools developed by modern criminology. He cannot grant a suspended sentence which includes supervised probation, or
commit the obviously ill to a medical institution, or obtain any of the
information essential to intelligent disposition of the cases. There is
neither the time nor the facilities for obtaining pre-sentence reports or
checking with other social agencies for information about the defendants. One woman defendant found walking the streets stated that she
had no family and no friends in Philadelphia and lived in rooming
houses with temporary work as a typist. She appeared to be mentally
ill, and the magistrate was obviously trying to make a more constructive disposition of her case than sentencing her to the House of Correction. He finally discharged her and sent her to the YWCA in a
cab, but he had no means of insuring that she would get attention or
even that she would go there. A complete gulf separates the magistrates' courts from constructive welfare and treatment facilities.
The explanation of the tolerance by bar and public of such abuse
of elementary procedural rights is rooted in one fact: most of the defendants are drawn from skid row-drunks, idlers, loungers, suspected
petty criminals, beggars, bench-sleepers. Perhaps most are chronic
alcoholics, often incapable of aiding themselves, and many are transients
in a strange city. Economically most are at or near the level of poverty.
Many persons interviewed during this study summed up this attitude
and explained their lack of concern with what the police and magistrates
do by the label they attached to the entire group: "Bums."
VII. CONCLUSION

Some of the abuses which have been outlined can be met by reforms such as (1) extension of the Voluntary Defender system to the
magistrates' courts, which would not only provide legal aid where it
is urgently needed but would result in an immediate raising of the level
of procedural fairness in vagrancy-type proceedings; (2) transfer of
jurisdiction over vagrancy-type offenses to the Municipal Court to
achieve essential centralization in the handling of the cases and to provide the necessary probation, social service and psychiatric diagnostic
and treatment services; (3) development and utilization of other treatment possibilities for indigent alcoholics, with commitment to the House
of Correction reserved for use only as a last resort if no other treatment
program can be developed.
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Beyond such immediate procedural and treatment reforms, however, is the need for re-examination of the whole vagrancy policy of
our law. Little can be said in support of the use of vagrancy-type
statutes to repress alcoholism, for the recidivism of the confirmed "habitual drunkard" shows that short prison sentences are wholly ineffective as a means of treating what is essentially a medical problem."6'
Nor is there any legal or policy justification for imprisoning people
because their poverty or characterization as "bums" makes them vaguely
undesirable. The use of vagrancy sanctions to deter such persons from
entering Philadelphia and to banish them if they do come is unconstitutional and indefensible. The only reason such administration is
tolerated is because the defendants involved are too poor or too weak
to assert their obvious rights.
If vagrancy-law administration in Philadelphia involves any socially desirable policy, therefore, it is because its flexibility gives the
police a residual discretionary power to control suspicious persons or
harass suspected professional criminals. This is an illusory advantage,
for the substitution of harassment for the more difficult job of obtaining the evidence necessary to convict criminals of the substantive offenses of which they are guilty encourages superficial and inefficient
police work. 1 7 If the suspect is actually a professional criminal, harassment with a three months vagrancy sentence serves neither the incapacitative nor the deterrent end of the criminal law.' 68 At most it
166. An example of the recidivism is given at p. 627 supra. Of 5166 inmates
committed.to the House of Correction in 1950, 40%o had prior commitments to that
institution; 6.3% had more than ten prior commitments; and 1.4% more than 30 commitments. PHILADELPHIA Housn or CoarcTioN, ANN. RE,. 50 (1950). Of the cases
studied by HILLR & REcToR, op. cit. supra note 110, many involved repeated recidivism.
Compare the report on a 51 year old Seattle alcoholic, who in a 25 year period was
arrested 223 times and spent 11 years and 143 days in Seattle City Jail on short sentences for drunkenness. Seattle Times, Oct. 17, 1946, p. 10, col. 1. See also New York
Times, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 14, col. 1 (Brooklyn man arrested 103 times for intoxication
and vagrancy since 1925). The cost of such treatment is staggering. In Philadelphia
County alone, 1430 vagrants and 1645 habitual drunkards were committed in 1950, at
a cost of over $400,000 for House of Correction maintenance alone. Figure compiled
from PIILADELPHIA HousE or CoaaXcTIoN, ANN. RtP. (1950), on the basis of an
average stay of 58 days per inmate at $2.34 a day. To this must be added the combined
value of police services diverted from more important tasks to handle this multitude
of cases.
167. "The underlying purpose [of public enemy vagrancy laws] is to relieve the
police of the necessity of proving that criminals have committed or are planning to
commit specific crimes." N.Y. LAW RMvIsION COMMISSION, REPORT 591 (1935).
168. Under an Illinois reputation-vagrancy law, ". . . we have harassed and convicted otherwise immune gangsters, kidnapers, gunmen, thugs and racketeers in the
persons of Maxie Eisen, 'Machine Gunner' Jack McGurn, 'King of the Bomb Throwers' James Belcastro, 'Two Gun' Louie Alterie, and numerous mad dogs of the west
side ...

."

Testimony of Thomas A. Green, in Hearings, supra note 100, at 307. This

campaign was short-lived, however, as the statute was declared unconstitutional. People
v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934). As the maximum penalty was six
months, it seems doubtful that such a conviction is much of a solution to the problem
posed by a man called "King of the Bomb Throwers."
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may drive a few criminals into another jurisdiction without any net
improvement in the control of crime. If the defendant is suspected
merely because of his past criminal record, vagrancy-type harassment,
like criminal registration ordinances,' 169 impedes the rehabilitative end
of the criminal law by closing

".

..

the doors to reformation, re-

pentence or a new try at life." 1' In fact vagrancy laws of the Pennsylvania type can never be an effective harassment device, for their
utility depends upon illegal administration, and the illegality means
that any professional criminal with funds at his disposal can gain a
speedy release by retaining an attorney to bring habeas corpus."7 ' Thus
only the paupers and the helpless can be harassed with vagrancy-type
commitments to the House of Correction.
Nor is harassment either a necessary or a desirable method of
deterring professional criminality. Probationary control over a defendant who has once been convicted offers a more equitable and effective means of supervising persons suspect because of past criminality.
Requiring such a probationer to report on his employment, his income
and his net worth at periodic intervals would be a far more efficient
deterrent against a return to criminality than to permit the police to
arrest him at will for consorting or other vaguely suspicious activities.
One cannot escape the conclusion that the administration of vagrancy-type laws serves as an escape hatch to avoid the rigidity imposed
by real or imagined defects in criminal law and procedure. To the
extent that such rigidity presents a real problem and that the need for a
safety valve is not merely the product of inefficiency on the part of police
or prosecutors, such a problem should not be dealt with by indirection.
If it is necessary to ease the prosecution's burden of proof or to legalize
arrests for mere suspicion, then the grave policy and constitutional problems posed by such suggestions should be faced. If present restrictions
on the laws of attempts or arrest place too onerous a burden upon the
police because of the nature of modern crime, then such propositions
should be discussed and resolved on their merits, as, for example, the
proposals in the Uniform Arrest Act.' 72
The economic purposes which once gave vagrancy a function no
longer exist, and the philosophy and practices of welfare agencies have
169. See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control of Potential
Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 60 (1954).
170. People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 327, 199 N.E. 495, 499 (1936).
171. An example was revealed during the hearings of the Kefauver Committee in
which Samuel Hoffman, a Philadelphian with a long criminal record, was arrested as
he got off the train at 30th Street Station and immediately sentenced to a year as a vagrant. He retained an attorney and was promptly released on habeas corpus. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, March 6, 1951, p. 31, col. 7.
172. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. RZv. 315, 343-47 (1942).
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so changed relief methods that a criminal sanction to enforce an Elizabethan poor law concept is outdated. To try to utilize a feudal statute
as a weapon against modern crime and as a means of liberalizing the
restrictions of criminal law and procedure is both inefficient and an
invitation to the kind of abuses which this study has shown to be widespread.
It was to avoid just such abuses that the restrictions of our criminal procedure were developed. If the administrative flexibility gained
by the circumvention of that procedure in vagrancy-type cases has resulted in a return of those abuses, perhaps that more than anything else
demonstrates the wisdom of our traditional procedural protections.

